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THE DEMISE OF DISPARATE IMPACT EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN THE REHNQUIST COURT
[Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 US. 977, (1988);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 US. 642 (1989)]
KURT RICHARD MATTSON*
The disparate impact theory has been in existence since
1971, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was applied
by the Supreme Court to cases of discrimination where
intent was missing or hard to prove, but yet was apparent.
Confusion over its application has accompanied the anal-
ysis since that date. After much debate and discrepancy
among the circuit courts, the United States Supreme Court
held in Watson that the analysis would apply to subjec-
tive, as well as objective, criteria. Clouded and unclear in
its application of objective, criteria, the Watson decision
did little to alter the test for its implementation. This
uncertainty was to last only 11 months, as the Wards
Cove decision gave definition to the Court's view of the
future of subjective criteria in the disparate impact analy-
sis, Title VII, and employment discrimination suits in
general.
INTRODUCTION
For many, the 1960s was a time of free spirits, free living, and
freedom. For others it was a time of misery, bias, and discrimina-
tion. Included in the latter group were blacks, women, and other
disadvantaged minorities. Their voices of pain and mistreatment
were finally heard in 1964, after years of unfair treatment. With
encouragement from President Johnson, the U.S. Congress passed
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The Civil Rights Act
contained a remedy for discrimination in employment, the setting
for much of the mistreatment of minorities. The authors designed
this remedial and humanitarian legislation to provide relief for
individuals denied employment or mistreated in an occupation
* B.A., University of Minnesota (Minneapolis), 1985; J.D., William Mitchell College of
Law (St. Paul), 1988; L.L.M. (Labor and Employment Law), The National Law Center,
George Washington University (Washington, D.C.), 1990.
1. 42 Civil Rights Act Title VII, U.S.C. §§ 2000e(1)-(17) (1982).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:39
because of an employer's bias and sentiment.2
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization to discriminate against any person because of
that individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3
Although the legislative history of the Act is confusing and convo-
luted, courts have agreed that the fundamental purpose is clear:
the goal of Congress was to prohibit any and all employment prac-
tices that discriminate against individuals because of their inclu-
sion in one of the enumerated classes.4 Claims under the Act may
arise under two different theories - discriminatory treatment or
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court in Gniggs
commented on the Congressional intent of the Act:
The objective of Congress . . . was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
Id. at 429-31. See also infra notes 151-167 and accompanying text (discussing Watson).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (1982).
4. L. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw § 1.1 (2d ed. 1988). The Civil
Rights Act, enacted July 2, 1964, was designed to tear down the barriers that had denied
blacks access to everything from drinking fountains to employment. Id. It also marked one
of the most dramatic debates in Senate history. Id.
Southern Senators tried to block the bill with a filibuster that lasted a record 83 days.
Washington Times, July 3, 1989, at A3, col. 1. The civil rights legislation was first proposed
by President Kennedy in 1963, and was given little chance of success at that time. Id.
Critics complained that [the proposed legislation] was too ambitious. Not only
would it ban discrimination in voter registration, but it would outlaw segregation
in public facilities, a system entrenched in the Deep South. Ironically, it was Mr.
Kennedy's assassination that gave the bill its first push. When Mr. Johnson
succeeded [Kennedy as President], he made the bill more acceptable by toning
down its preachy language and framing it as the last of the slain President's
legislative priorities. 'He in effect put it as a memorial to Kennedy,' said Mr.
Reedy. After that, I knew it would pass.'
Id. at A3, col.5.
The House passed the bill by a crushing margin. Id. at A3, col.6. However, to facilitate
its passage in the Senate, proponents managed to remove the legislation from the review of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, where the committee's Southern chair undoubtedly would
have killed it by sending it directly to the Senate floor. Id. "The act's foes mobilized. When
attempts to move the bill back to committee failed, they launched what Sen. Richard B.
Russell, Georgia Democrat, called 'the war' - a formal filibuster." Id.
The debate often lasted until 2 a.m. Id. at A3, col.6. Cots were set up in the chambers
for Senators too exhausted to continue. Id. The Southerners thought the filibuster would
break up the coalition of Northerners and Republicans backing the bill; however, support to
defeat the filibuster grew until there were enough votes to end it with a two-thirds major-
ity. Id. The bill passed the Senate 73-27 on the 83rd day of debate. Id. On that warm July
evening, President Johnson signed the bill into law, and asked supporters and foes alike to
"" 'close the springs of racial poison.'" Id.
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disparate impact.5
The standards annunciated in the civil rights legislation have
recently been reassessed. The United States Supreme Court
reviewed the standards for determining unlawful employment dis-
crimination in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust' and Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc.7 Watson involved an employee's
challenge of her employer's promotion practices.' The Court held
that promotion determinations based on subjective criteria could
be challenged by using the disparate impact analysis.9 This deci-
sion released Title VII plaintiffs challenging subjective employ-
ment practices from the burden of showing that the employer
intended to discriminate. The plaintiff needed only to show dis-
crimination through a production of statistical data, a requirement
5. L. MODJESKA, supra note 4, § 1.6.
6. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). See Feldstein, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust:
Reallocating the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 919 (1989); Note, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust: The Supreme Court and
Employment Discrimination: Disparate Views on Disparate Impact, 40 MERCER L. REV.
1025 (1989).
7. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
8. See infra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
9. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 984 (1988). This was the only
point upon which the Watson Court was unanimous. See infra note 66. Indeed, many
employers implement subjective criteria to make hiring and promotion decisions. Rigler,
Title VIIAnd The Applicability Of Disparate Impact Analysis To Subjective Criteria, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 25 (1985). These criteria have included: "[a]ppearance, articulateness, fitness,
ability to lead, friendliness, and aggressiveness .. ." Id. Objective criteria, utilized in
employment decision making, on the other hand, usually include specific education, work
experience, test results, and license requirements. Comment, Defining the Proper Bounds
of Disparate Impact Analysis: Beyond an Objective/Subjective Employment Criteria
Dichotomy, 49 U. PITr. L. REV. 657, 658 (1988) [hereinafter Defining the Proper Bounds of
Disparate Impact].
Discretionary decisionmaking by the employer may also be classified as subjective. Id.
at 659. For example, an employer might use an "eyeball" test to select applicants for a job
requiring physical strength. The result most likely would be that male supervisors might
tend to systematically to underestimate the strength of females applying for the job.
Another employment practice challenged is "grapevine hiring," which is to announce job
openings only to members of the current work force, thereby giving preference to friends,
relatives, or those of the same ethnic group as the current employees. See, e.g., Comment,
Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under Title VII, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
957, 962 (1987) [hereinafter Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment]; Daves v.
Payless Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding company's
"grapevine hiring" where current employees in receiving and yard positions were
promoted to fill vacant indoor lumber sales positions). Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694
F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1982) (in making a claim that an employer's promotion policy
disproportionately affects minorities, plaintiff has the initial burden of proving the selection
process resulted in a significant discriminatory pattern for promotions, and to prevail on the
theory, plaintiff "need only demonstrate a lack of objective criteria and disparity in job
promotions."); Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842
(10th Cir. 1981) (in disparate impact analysis, a rational or legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason is insufficient; the practice must be essential and the purpose compelling).
In actions using the discriminatory treatment analysis, courts often classify the
employer's use of subjective employment practice as evidence of discriminatory intent.
Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment, supra. See, e.g., Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d
1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981).
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which is even more difficult to satisfy.1° One year later, however,
Wards Cove created a heavier burden of proof for the employee
claiming disparate impact in an employer's practices.'1 The Court
forced the plaintiff to identify and prove the disparate impact of a
specifically challenged employment practice.'
This article will discuss the standards under which employ-
ment discrimination cases are reviewed, and will review and
examine the Title VII cases leading up to the Watson decision.
These stare decisis decisions created a disturbance in the Court,
and resulted in the confusing and question-riddled decision of
Watson and the startling result of Wards Cove.
I. DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT
Employment discrimination cases involve the treatment of
one individual, by the employer, that is different from treatment
given to another on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. The critical element in such a case is discrimina-
tory intent.' 3 The first case to apply this analysis was McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,'4 where the issue was whether the refusal
to rehire a former employee was based on racial discrimination in
violation of the Act. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine the order and nature of proof in Title VII
cases. 15
10. Mertens, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust: Unanswered Questions, 14
EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 163, 171-72 (1988). Indeed, D.C. Delegate Walter Fauntroy
commented that the rallying cry, in light of these recent Supreme Court decisions, has
changed from "We shall overcome" to "We shall overturn." Washington Times, July 3,
1989, at A3, col. 3.
11. See infra notes 224-79 and accompanying text.
12. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
13. See L. MODJESKA, supra note 4, at § 1.6.
14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1973). The respondent,
a black man, worked for McDonnell Douglas as a mechanic and lab technician from 1956
until 1964. Id. at 794. In 1964 Green was laid off as part of a general reduction in the labor
force. Green protested his discharge and accused McDonnell Douglas of racially motivated
hiring practices. Id.
Subsequent to Green's discharge, he allegedly participated in a "lock-in" and a "stall-
in." Id. at 794-95. Three weeks later, McDonnell Douglas publicly advertised for qualified
mechanics. Id. at 796. Green promptly applied for the position. Id. He was rejected. Id.
Green filed a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
accusing McDonnell Douglas of refusing to hire him because of his race and continued
involvement in the civil rights movement in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-3(a).
Id. The EEOC found reasonable cause to support Green's claim under section 2000e-3(a)
and advised him of his right to sue in federal court within the 30-day limit. Id. at 797.
The district court held that McDonnell Douglas was justified in refusing to rehire
Green. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 318 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D.Mo. 1970). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the
district court to determine whether McDonnell Douglas had committed discriminatory
hiring practices. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972) reh'g
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A unanimous Supreme Court declared that a "complainant in
a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination."' 6 The
Court held that a plaintiff must prove:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.'
7
The Court also agreed with the court of appeals in holding
that Green had made out a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion - he sought a mechanics position for which he was qualified,
and McDonnell Douglas continued to seek applications for the
mechanic's position after Green was rejected.' 8
After the claimant has presented a prima facie case, "the bur-
den then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' 9
McDonnell Douglas stated that Green's participation in a road-
block "tie up" and a "lock-in" were the nondiscriminatory reasons
denied (June 28, 1972). The majority of the court of appeals found that Green had
established a prima facie case of discrimination based upon race; that McDonnell Douglas's
refusal to rehire Green rested on "subjective" criteria which carried little weight in
challenging the charges of discrimination; that Green should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas's reasons for not rehiring him were mere pretext. Id.
at 343-44.
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
17. Id. See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711
(1983) (plaintiff must present evidence as to whether the rejection was discriminatory). In
Aikens, the Court stated:
[Wlhen the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the action for
lack of prima facie case, and responds to the plaintiff's proof by offering
evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the factfinder must then
decide whether the rejection was. discriminatory within the meaning of Title
VII.
Id. at 714-15 (footnote omitted). But see Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir.
1982) (plaintiff in Title VII sex discrimination case can establish a prima facie case of dis-
criminatory treatment without setting forth all four of the McDonnell Douglas criteria);
Ostroff v. Employment Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1982) (prima facie case estab-
lished even though second part of the McDonnell-Douglas test was not proven).
18. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
19. Id. Compare Knight v. City of Bogalusa, La., 673 F.2d 759, 761, appeal after
remand, 717 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1982) (employer's burden of articulating a
nondiscriminatory reason is met if "defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff") with Wright v. Western Elec. Co., 664 F.2d
959, 964 (5th Cir. 1981) (employer met its burden of articulating nondiscriminatory reasons
for refusal to hire plaintiff where alleged that those hired had qualifications superior to
plaintiff) and Danzl v. North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale Indep. School Dist. No. 622, 663
F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1981) (defendant must only "'articulate,' a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring plaintiff").
1991]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:39
for his rejection for re-employment. 20 At this point, the Court
believed this reason to be sufficient to discharge its burden of
proof.2 1 Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the Court, reasoned
that "[n]othing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and
rehire [an individual] who has engaged in such deliberate, unlaw-
ful activity against it. '"I The analysis did not, however, stop there:
Title VII did not, without more, compel the rehiring of Green;
neither did it permit McDonnell Douglas to use Green's illegal
conduct "as a pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by
[Section] 703(aX 1 )."23
Certiorari was granted in Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters 2 4 to define the scope of the prima facie case articulated in
McDonnell Douglas.2 The Court reversed the decision of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the appellate court
erred in "equating a prima facie case showing under McDonnell
Douglas with an ultimate finding of fact as to discriminatory
refusal to hire under Title VII. .... 126 The court of appeals
required that the employer show not only that the hiring proce-
dures were reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, but also
that the procedure used allowed the employer to consider the
qualifications of the largest number of minority applicants.27
The Furnco Court eliminated the second requirement, and
reversed and remanded the appellate court's decision, setting out
20. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803.
21. Id.
22. Id. The Court did not decide whether unlawful activity not directed specifically at
the employer (which was not the situation in the case) would be a legitimate justification not
to hire an individual. Id. at 803 n.17.
23. Id. at 804. The trial court, on remand, was directed to give Green "a fair
opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact
pretext." Id. The Court stated that Green should present evidence, if available, that
showed that white employees were rehired even though they too participated in the illegal
demonstrations. Id. Additional evidence that the Court thought would be relevant would
include facts as to McDonnell Douglas' treatment of Green during his prior term of
employment; McDonnell Douglas's reaction, if any, to Green's legitimate civil rights
activities; and McDonnell Douglas's general policy and practice regarding minority
employment, including statistics. Id. at 804-05. If proved, McDonnell Douglas could,
according to the Supreme Court, establish that the refusal to rehire those involved in the
illegal activities was not discrimination based on race, but that the criteria was applied alike
to members of all races. Id. at 805-06. On remand, the district court held that McDonnell
Douglas had shown "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the reason for their refusal
to hire Green was because of his activity in the illegal protests, and not because of his civil
rights actions. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501, 503 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
Plaintiff Green then appealed the decision of the district court. Green v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision, stating that the statistical evidence
presented actually supported the position of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 1105.
24. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
25. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
26. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
27. Id. at 576-77.
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a clearer definition of the discriminatory treatment case.2 None
of the evidence admitted established that the hiring policies and
practices of Furnco Construction were a pretext to discriminate
against black bricklayers, or were otherwise illegitimate, or pos-
sessed a disproportionate impact or effect on black bricklayers.2 9
However, these facts did not negate the prima facie case estab-
lished by the three claimants.30
The Furnco Court stated that a prima facie case, under
McDonnell Douglas, raises an inference of discrimination only
because the acts are most likely based on illegal considerations.3 '
The Court reasoned that such an inference arises because "people
do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons, especially in a business setting. ' 32 Further, when all of
the legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant are discounted as
possible reasons for the actions of the employer, then "it is more
likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only
with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consider-
ation such as race."33
Once a prima facie case is established by the employee or
applicant, the employer bears the burden of demonstrating only
that his considerations were based on legitimate reasons.34 The
28. Id.
29. Id. at 571. Furneo had a self-imposed affirmative action program. Id. at 572. The
superintendent had even gone as far as to hire several bricklayers who had previously filed
a discrimination suit against the company. Id.
30. Id. at 575. The Court found that the respondents carried the initial burden by
proving the following: they were members of a racial minority; they took all reasonable
steps to apply for the bricklaying positions; they were qualified (which Furnco conceded);
they were not offered employment (though later Smith was); and Furnco continued to seek
persons of similar qualifications. Id. The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with the
hiring procedure created by the court of appeals, and substituted its own judgment for that
of the employer who claimed his practices did not violate Title VII. Id. at 576-77.
31. Id. at 577.
32. Id.
33. Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Under McDonnell Douglas, the employer must only "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973). See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981) (the Supreme Court made it easier for employers to rebut charges of
discriminatory treatment). In Burdine, the Court explained that the ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the
employee remains at all times with the plaintiff, while the burden of production shifts
between the parties. Id. at 252-56. After supplying "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons" to explain hiring practices, the defendant does not have to persuade the court that
it was motivated by the proffered reasons. Id. at 254. The Burdine Court found that the
court of apppeals imposed a greater burden than required by McDonnell Douglas. Id. at
257. That court required the defendant to persuade the court of its objective reasons for
preferring the chosen applicant. Id. at 249. The Burdine Court held that the employer's
burden of production, however, must only raise a genuine issue of fact as to the
discrimination alleged by the plaintiff; the defendant's explanation must be legally sufficient
to justify a judgment for the employer. Id. at 255-56.
See also Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)
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Furnco Court held that after a prima facie case is established, the
employer need not prove he pursued the practice that enabled
him to achieve his own business goal, and one which allowed him
to consider the most employment applications.35
II. DISPARATE IMPACT
Disparate impact cases focus on employment practices that,
facially neutral, operate to adversely affect protected groups and
which cannot be justified by business necessity.36 Unlike the dis-
criminatory treatment analysis, proving a discriminatory intent is
not required in an impact case. 37 Rather, it is job-relatedness that
is important for such a prima facie case.3 8 In any event, the
(indicating that the employer need only "'articulat[e] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason"' for the employee's rejection and is not required to prove absence of
discriminatory motive); Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment, supra note 9, at 961.
See generally Freeman v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 398, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (once plaintiff
establishes prima facie case, burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to defendant);
Muntin v. California Parks & Recreation Dep't., 671 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir. 1982) ("the
evidence used to establish the prima facie case may be so conclusive as to establish, as a
matter of law, the fact of discriminatory intent."). Cf Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical
Clinic, Inc., 660 F.2d 1064, 1067, (5th Cir. 1981) ("the more subjective the qualification
sought and the more subjective the manner in which it is measured, the more difficult will
be the defendant's task in meeting the burden imposed by Burdine") cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 456 U.S. 969 (1982).
35. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. "Courts are generally less competent than employers to
restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not
attempt it." Id. at 578. Under the requirements created by the court of appeals, the
employer would be required to adopt the "best" hiring procedures. Id. However, this is
not required by Title VII under Furnco. Id. at 577-78.
In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist (writing for the majority) suggested that disparate
impact analysis was inappropriate as the plaintiffs were not challenging a test or a
particularized employment practice. Id. at 575 n.7 ("This case did not involve employment
tests, which we dealt with in [Griggs], and in [Albemarle Paper], or particularized
requirements such as the height and weight specifications..." (citations omitted).
36. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1115 (D.S.C. 1977), aff'd,
National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). In United States v. South
Carolina, the court held that under the business necessity requirement of the Equal
Opportunity Act, courts should make "an examination of the alternatives available with
respect to the legitimate employment objective identified by the employer to determine
whether there is available to the employer an alternative practice that would achieve his
business purpose equally well but with a lesser disparate impact by race. In examining
alternatives, risk and cost to the employer are relevant." Id. See also Coe v. Yellow Freight
System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1981) (discriminatory impact not established by
showing of one isolated decision). See generally Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs
in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1982); Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking The
Application of Title Vii's Disparate Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 869.
37. See supra notes 13-36 and accompanying text.
38. See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1286 (9th Cir. 1981) (Tang, J.,
concurring in part). Contreras discussed the employer's burden of proof required by Craig
v. Los Angeles County, 626 F.2d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 1980) and deLaurier v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 685 (9th Cir. 1978) (employer must prove test to be
"significantly job-related") and is more consistent with Congress' Title VII intent than the
interpretation of the employer's burden of proof in Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d
1367, 1378 (9th Cir. 1979) (employer must not only prove that the screening device is job
related, he must further prove it "'necessary to safe and efficient job performance"'
(quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977))). In deLaurier, the court of
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United States Supreme Court has not expounded a precise scope
for the correct application of the disparate impact model.39
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 4 0 set out requirements and stan-
dards for a Title VII claim under a disparate impact analysis.41
Griggs determined whether an employer was prohibited, by Title
VII, from requiring a high school education or the passing of a
standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employ-
ment in or promotion to jobs under specific conditions, when: (1)
neither test "is shown to be significantly related to successful job
performance;" (2) both criteria operate to disqualify black appli-
cants at a substantially higher rate than white applicants; and (3)
appeals sustained a regulation mandating leave for female school teachers at the beginning
of their ninth month of pregnancy, which was justified by the desire of the school district to
predict with certainty the date of departure for those teachers. deLaurier, 588 F.2d at 680.
See also Clady v. Los Angeles County, 770 F.2d 1421, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1109 (1986) (where employer shows job-relatedness of test, burden shifts to
plaintiff to prove other selection methods with less discriminatory impact would serve
employer's legitimate interest equally as well).
In contrast to the holdings of the Ninth Circuit, several courts have held that the
business necessity defense is not satisfied merely by proof that the employment practice
serves a legitimate business purpose. The Fourth Circuit stated:
[Tihe applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for
adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there
must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would
better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well
with a lesser differential racial impact.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted). The
Robinson Court also noted that "[i]t should go without saying that a practice is hardly 'nec-
essary' if an alternative practice better effectuates the intended purpose or is equally effec-
tive but less discriminatory." Id. at n.7. The Fifth Circuit addressed this question in Diaz v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (before discrimination can
be practiced, it must be shown that an alternative practice is impractical, and that the cur-
rent practice is necessary to the business). See also L. MODJESKA, supra note 5, § 1.8, at 30.
Compare Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 1982) ("flight
hostesses" classification and weight requirements of position invalidated by Title VII as non-
critical factors) with Local 189, Papermakers & Paperworkers AFL-CIO, CLC v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980, 992 (5th Cir. 1969) (no discrimination under Title VII when defend-
ant's conduct evidences an economic purpose). See infra note 127 for a discussion of the
validity of weight and height restrictions under Dothard.
39. See Defining the Proper Bounds of Disparate Impact Analysis, supra note 9, at 667-
68. See, e.g., Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575 (noting that disparate impact's prima facie case "[is]
not intended to be an inflexible rule").
40. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59
(1972) (review of history of employment discrimination to date of the Griggs decision).
41. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971); Carpenter v. Stephen F.
Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 623 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally Willborn, The Disparate
Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 799, 833-37 (1985).
Compare Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 610 (disparate impact analysis inapplicable where criterion
affects job category in which most employees are same sex) with Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d
158, 162 (1st Cir. 1982) (plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of sex discrimination
under disparate impact theory by only proving that defendant police department's height
requirement would eliminate from employment eligibility more women than men).
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the positions in question had formerly been held only by white
employees as part of a long-standing practice of giving preference
to whites.42
The district court concluded that prior to July 2, 1965, 43 Duke
Power openly discriminated in the hiring and assigning of employ-
ees at its Dan River plant on the basis of race.4 In 1955, Duke
Power instituted a policy of requiring a high school education for
an initial assignment for all of its departments except Labor, and
for transfer from Coal Handling to any "inside" department.4a
Further, the completion of high school was also made a prerequi-
site to transfer from Labor to any other department when the
company abandoned its policy of limiting blacks to employment to
the Labor Department in 1965.46 However, from the institution
of this requirement in 1965 to the time of the district court trial,
white employees hired before the time of the requirement contin-
ued to perform satisfactorily and achieve promotions in the "oper-
ating" departments.47
When Title VII became effective, Duke Power Company
added an additional requirement that, to qualify for placement in
any but the Labor Department, the employee had to have regis-
tered passing scores on two professionally prepared aptitude tests
and have a high school education.48 In September of 1965, Duke
Power began to permit incumbent employees who lacked a high
school education to qualify for transfer from Labor or Coal Han-
dling to an "inside" job by passing the two tests.
42. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426. In Griggs, a group of incumbent black employees brought
a class action against the Duke Power Company, challenging the validity of the company's
promotion and transfer system. Id. All of the petitioners were employed at Duke's Dan
River Steam Station, a power generating operation in Draper, North Carolina. Id. At the
time the claim was initiated the company had 95 employees at the Dan River plant. Id.
Fourteen of those employees were black; all but one were petitioners in this case. Id. The
promotion and transfer system included use of intelligence and mechanical ability tests,
which were alleged to be racially discriminatory and a denial of equal opportunity for
advancement into jobs classified above the menial laborer category. Id. at 427-28.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (effective on July 2,
1965).
44. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427. "[Blacks] were employed only in the Labor Department
where the highest paying jobs paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the other four
.operating' departments [where] only whites were [positioned]." Id. Promotions were
made within each department based on seniority, and workers who transferred into a new
department usually began at the lowest position. Id.
45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971). The "inside" departments
were Operations, Maintenance, and Laboratory. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 427-28. The two professional tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test and
the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Id. at 428. Neither test was directed or
intended to measure the ability to learn how to perform a particular job or category of jobs
at the plant. Id.
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The district court in Griggs held that, while the company pre-
viously followed a policy of overt racial discrimination for some
time before the enactment of Title VII, the conduct had since
ceased.49 Further, the court concluded that Title VII was
intended to be prospective only.50 Thus, the court held that the
discriminatory acts of the company were prior to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and were beyond the scope of corrective action.51
Upon review, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, after much
consideration of this issue of first impression, defined the meaning
of Title VII, declaring "that a subjective test of the employer's
intent should govern, particularly in a close case... ."2 The court
reasoned that "there was no showing of a discriminatory purpose
in the adoption of the diploma and test requirements, [and thus,]
no violation of the Act."53 In so finding, the court of appeals
reversed the district court in part, rejecting the holding that
residual discrimination was insulated from remedial action.54
However, the court of appeals stated that the district court was
correct in concluding that there was no showing of racial purpose
or invidious intent in the adoption of the employment require-
ments, for these standards had been applied to whites and blacks
in the same manner.55 Moreover, the court of appeals held that
use of such prerequisites was permitted by the Civil Rights Act of
1964 - absent a discriminatory purpose.5 6
The plaintiff employees in Griggs also claimed that the tests
had to be job related in order to be valid under Section 703(h) of
49. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 251 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971).
53. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1233 (4th Cir. 1970). The appellate
court stated that the evidence on the record did not show that there was "any
discrimination in the administration and scoring of the tests," and also did not show that
"the tests [were] not professionally developed." Id.
54. Id. at 1231.
55. Id. at 1232-33. The court of appeals stated:
Although earlier in this opinion we upheld the district court's finding that the
company had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices prior to the Act and we
concluded also that the educational and testing requirements adopted by the
company continued the effects of this prior discrimination as to employees who
had been hired prior to the adoption of the educational requirement, it seems
reasonably clear that this requirement did have a genuine business purpose and
that the company initiated the policy with no intention to discriminate against
Negro employees who might be hired after the adoption of the educational
requirement....
Id.
56. Id. In so doing, the court of appeals rejected the claim that because the
requirements operated to eliminate a disproportionate number of blacks from
employment, they were unlawful under Title VII, unless shown to be job related.
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the Act.5 7  The plaintiffs argued that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines state that a test must
have significant correlation to the employment, and the district
court did not afford sufficient weight to this evidence. The court of
appeals, however, held that none of the cases supporting this argu-
ment, "stand for the proposition that an EEOC interpretation is
binding on the courts."'15  Hence, the court of appeals would not
grant relief to plaintiffs with a high school education, holding that
the tests required of Duke Power workers were not discriminato-
rily applied and did not have such an effect on these individuals.59
Upon grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion which clarified
Congress' purpose of Title VII.6 ° The Chief Justice stated that the
objective of the Act was plain from the statutory language "[to]
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barri-
ers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of
white employees over other employees."61 However, Chief Jus-
tice Burger held that Congress did not intend to guarantee
employment to every person, regardless of their qualifications, nor
does Title VII require that any person be hired because he was, at
one time, the subject of discrimination or a member of a minority
57. Id. at 1233.
58. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970). See also
International Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365, 366 (N.D.Miss.
1966). The Griggs appellate court explained:
We cannot agree with plaintiffs' contention that such an interpretation by EEOC
should be upheld where, as here, it is clearly contrary to compelling legislative
history and, as will be shown, the legislative history of § 703(h) will not support
the view that a "professionally developed ability test" must be job-related.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (1970) (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 1230: However, the six black employees who did not have a high school
education or its equivalent, and who were hired before the tests were put into place, were
found to be entitled to injunctive relief because they were hired only into the Labor
Department of the company. Id. Whites similarly situated, without a high school education
were hired to any of the departments and were free to transfer into better, higher-paying
positions. Id. at 1230-31.
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1989). The relevant EEOC Guidelines contains a general
rule of thumb, the "four-fifths" rule, which states that:
A selection rate for any race, sex or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be
regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.
Id.
61. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). The Court stated that
"[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430. See also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
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group.6 2 Rather, Burger explained that Congress sought to elimi-
nate discriminatory preference to any individual or group, major-
ity or minority. 3
This discriminatory preference can be found not only in overt
acts, but in fair practices that are discriminatory in operation. The
Court, in Griggs, reasoned that the "touchstone" was business
necessity, meaning that the qualification is related to job perform-
ance.' Thus, the Act prohibits an employment practice which
operates to exclude blacks, or another Title VII-protected class, if
it cannot be shown to be related to job performance. 5
Chief Justice Burger next applied the intent of Congress to
the situation at the Duke Power Company, and found that neither
the requirement of a high school education nor the general intelli-
gence test bore a demonstrative relationship to successful per-
formance of the jobs for which it was used.'
The Supreme Court reviewed the analysis of the court of
appeals, which defended Duke Power's requirements where there
was no "intention to discriminate against [the] Negro employ-
ees."-67 The Court refused to find that the two lower courts' exami-
nations of the employer's intent were wrong, but declared that
62. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
63. Id. at 431. Congress' intent was to remove all "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment" when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of an impermissible classification. Id.
64. Id. See also Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1186 (4th Cir. 1982). In Wright,
the Court of Appeals held that the disparate impact claim/business necessity theory of
claim and defense was appropriately used to resolve a challenge to the employer's "fetal
vulnerability." Id. These criteria excluded fertile women from certain jobs involving
possible exposure to harmful chemicals and restricted such women to certain limited
contact jobs on an individualized basis. Id. at 1190. But see Automobile Workers v. Johnson
Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (employer's policy barring fertile women from jobs
involving possible exposure to hazardous materials found discriminatory).
65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See generally Wilmore v. City
of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1983) ("the barrier to equal employment
opportunities here is not so much the isolated tests as it is the overall process firefighters
undergo to achieve promotion.").
66. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. The evidence demonstrated that the employees who
had not graduated from high school or passed the tests maintained satisfactory
performance, as well as making progress in departments where the prerequisites were
already in use. Id. "[B]etween July 2, 1965, and November 14, 1966, the percentage of
white employees who were promoted but who were not high school graduates was nearly
identical to the percentage of nongraduates in the entire work force." Id. at 432 n.7.
Further, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals finding that both
requirements were adopted without any meaningful study of their relationship to job-
performance ability. Id. at 431. The vice president of Duke Power testified that the
criteria were implemented on the Company's judgment that the requirements would
generally improve the overall quality of the work force. Id. The promotion records for the
present employees unable to meet the criteria suggested to Burger that the requirements
were not even necessary for the "limited purpose of preserving the avowed policy of
advancement within the Company." Id. at 432.
67. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970)).
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good intent or a lack of discriminatory intent would "not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate[d] as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups" and are unrelated to
measuring job capability.68 The Court explained that not simply
motivation, but the consequences of employment practices were
the thrust of the Civil Rights Act. The intent of discrimination
need not be proved. 9 Moreover, the Court noted that Congress
placed the burden on the employer to show that any requirement
for employment exhibited a "manifest relationship" to the position
in question. 0
Duke Power argued that the general intelligence tests it
administered were permitted by the specific provisions of section
703(h) of Title V11" The Supreme Court rebutted this by citing
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines,
which interpreted section 703(h) to apply to only job-related tests.
According to the Court, this interpretation is to be given great def-
erence.7 ' The Act and its legislative history were found to support
the Commission's construction - a valid reason for the Court to
treat the Guidelines as an expression of the will of Congress.73
Hence, the Court held that by allowing job-related qualifications
68. Id. The Court noted that Duke Power's lack of discriminatory intent was
evidenced by its special efforts to help the under-educated employees through company
financing of two-thirds of the cost of their tuition for the high school training. See also
Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Services, 859 F.2d 1523, 1531-32 (7th Cir.
1988) (substantial question as to whether problems sought to be avoided by hiring only
female prison guards at a women's correctional facility are suited to validation by empirical
study); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Mo. 1981), rev'd in part,
697 F.2d 810, 816 (8th Cir. 1983) (college degree requirement for position of trade returns
supervisor justified by business necessity, despite absence of validation study).
69. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
70. Id. The Court added, "[d]iplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has
mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality."
Id. at 433. See also Jones v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 615 F. Supp. 456, 464 (N.D.
Miss. 1985) (Griggs model applied in claim by two black prison guards who were not
promoted).
71. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433. Section 703(h) applies only to tests and has no application
to the high school diploma requirement. Id. This section provides for "the use of 'any
professionally developed ability test' that is not 'designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race .. d.' Id. at 433 (emphasis by the Court).
72. Id. at 433-34.
73. Id. at 434. Section 703(h) was not a part of the House version of the Civil Rights
Act, but was added in Senate debate. Id. This debate centered around the bill as proposed,
some legislators thinking it would prohibit all testing and force employers to hire
unqualified persons only because they were part of a group formerly subject to job
discrimination. Id. Title VII proponents wanted to assure critics throughout the debate
that the Act would have no impact on tests that were related to employment. Id. Senators
Case (R-N.J.) and Clark (D-Pa.), co-managers of the bill in the Senate, issued a memorandum
that stated that the proposed legislation "'expressly protects the employer's right to insist
that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifications.
Indeed, the very purpose of title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications,
rather than on the basis of race or color.' " Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7247) (emphasis by
the Court).
1991] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
in the Act, Congress made these the controlling factors, "so that
race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. ,74 Congress
dictated in Title VII that any test used must "measure the person
for the job and not the person in the abstract."7 5
Another question concerning Title VII was presented to the
Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.76 One of the
specific questions presented to the Court was the following:
"What must an employer show to establish that pre-employment
tests racially discriminatory in effect, though not in intent, are suf-
ficiently 'job related' to survive challenge under Title VII?"'77
The district court found that Albemarle Paper Co. had, prior
to January 1964, "strictly segregated" the departmental "lines of
progression" by retaining the higher paying and skilled line jobs
for whites.78 This "racially identifiable" progression system con-
tinued until a new collective bargaining agreement was struck in
1968.79 Further, the district court found that the reorganization
caused the black employees to be "'locked' in the lower paying
job classifications."810 In addition, the plant's original seniority sys-
tem, which was overtly segregated, was found to have resulted in
white workers obtaining seniority in the higher paying positions.
The district court, therefore, ordered Albemarle Paper to institute
a "plantwide" seniority system.81 Nonetheless, the district court
74. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
75. Id.
76. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
77. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 408 (1974). The other question
presented by Albemarle pertained to the correct standard to be used by federal courts in
determining an award of backpay to employees or applicants where the employer engaged
in an unlawful discriminatory employment practice. Id.
78. Id. at 409. The respondents in the case were a certified class of present and former
black employees at a paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, N.C.. Id. at 408. The Roanoke Rapids
plant converted timber into paper products and was organized into several functional
departments. Id. at 427. Each department had one or more distinct lines of progression
under the theory that workers could progress as they became more proficient at the
necessary skills. Id. The number and structure of the lines were restructured from time to
time. Certain lines were, for many years, more skilled and paid higher wages than others,
and until 1964, certain skilled lines employed strictly more skilled whites, who were paid
more than the others. Id. at 427.
In 1968, several of the unskilled lines, which employed black employees, were "end-
tailed" onto skilled lines, which employed white workers. Id. However, some top jobs in
certain lines required more skills than top positions in other lines. Id. Further, the high
school education requirement for jobs was instituted in the 1950's with the advent of new
technolcgy. Id. Soon after the Court, in Albemarle Paper, "concluded that this
requirement did not improve the quality of the labor force, the requirement was continued
until the District Court enjoined its use." Id. at 427-28.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 409. "The formerly 'Negro' lines of progression had been merely tacked on
to the bottom of the formerly 'white' lines and promotions, demotions, and layoffs
continued to be governed - where skills were 'relatively equal' - by a system of 'job
seniority."' Id. (the Supreme Court quoting the lower court).
81. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 409.
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refused to enjoin the paper company's testing program, which
required all applicants, in the skilled lines of progression, to pass
two tests and have a high school diploma."2 The district court
found the tests to be justified as accurate examinations of predic-
tions of job performance.83 The respondents did not challenge this
finding of the court; instead, they appealed the denial of backpay
and its refusal to enjoin or limit Albemarle's use of the tests.8 4
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court, holding that backpay should have
been awarded and the tests enjoined. 5 The appellate court gave
great deference to the EEOC guidelines86 which were promul-
gated as a "workable set of standards for employers, unions and
employment agencies in determining whether their selection pro-
cedures conform with the obligations contained in title [sic]
V11 .... ,"87
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict
among the circuits on the issues of backpay and the showing
needed to establish the "job relatedness" of pre-employment
tests.8 8 The review of the tests was strictly to determine if they
were job related.8 9 The Albemarle Court stated that "[t]he con-
82. Id. at 410. The tests were used beginning in the late 1950's "to screen [job]
applicants for entry into the skilled lines." Id. at 428. Originally the company used the
Beta and Bennett tests, but then dropped the Bennett and replaced it with Wonderlic. Id.
at 428-29. The Revised Beta Examination, allegedly a measure of nonverbal intelligence,
and the Wonderlic Personnel Test... allegedly a measure of verbal [ability]." Id. at 410-11.
After the Supreme Court decision in Griggs, and shortly before the Albemarle trial was
to commence, the paper company enlisted an industrial psychologist to examine the "job
relatedness" of the testing program. Id. at 411. His study compared the test scores of
current employees with supervisorial judgments of their competence in ten job groupings
selected from the middle or top of the plant's skilled lines of progression. The study showed
a statistically significant correlation with supervisorial ratings in three job groupings for the
Beta Test, in seven job groupings for either Form A or Form B of the Wonderlic Test, and
two job groupings for the required battery of both the Beta and the Wonderlic Tests." Id.
83. Id. The district court agreed with the study's results and validated the tests as
being job-related.
84. Id.
85. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 140-41 (4th Cir. 1973). In examining
the trial court's ruling on the pre-employment tests, the appellate court declared that it was
an error:
to approve a validation study done without job analysis, to allow Albemarle to
require tests for 6 lines of progression where there has been no validation study
at all, and to allow Albemarle to require a person to pass two tests for entrance
into 7 lines of progression when only one of those tests was validated for that line
of progression.
Id. at 138.
86. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 412 (1974).
87. Id. at 412-13 (quoting 29 CFR § 1607.1(c)). See generally Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607, 1607.1(C) (1978) (July 1, 1986 ed.). See
infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
88. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 413.
89. Id. at 425. To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the complainant must
show "that the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
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cept of job relatedness takes on meaning from the facts of the
Griggs case," because the testing in Griggs was quite similar to
that of Albemarle Paper.9 ° The Court explained that "[t]he ques-
tion of job relatedness must be viewed in the context of the plant's
operation and the history of the testing program." '91 Albemarle
Paper then added the passing of the Wonderlic test in 1963 for
skilled line positions, claiming that a certain verbal intelligence
was needed for the operation of the increasingly sophisticated
plant equipment.92 However, the tests were not validated as to
job relatedness.9 3 When Albemarle Paper ceased overt segrega-
tion in the lines of progression in 1964, blacks were permitted to
transfer to the skilled lines upon passing the Beta and Wonderlic
examinations, using the national norm as the cut-off for hiring.94
Few passed the test.95 Those employees already working in the
skilled lines were not required to pass the examinations to keep
their positions or receive promotions.96
The Supreme Court reviewed the validation studies con-
ducted on the tests and agreed with the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals that the research did not prove the two tests to be suffi-
ciently job related.97 The Court cited the EEOC guidelines,
drafted for the purpose of determining job relatedness of employ-
ment tests.9" The Court noted again that, although not legally
binding, the guidelines were deserving of "great deference." 99
Justice Stewart stated that the message of the guidelines was the
same as the holding in Griggs: that discriminatory tests "are
impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods,
to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important ele-
ments of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." Id. If the employer met the
burden of proving that the tests are job related, the complaining party, to prevail, must
then show that there are other tests or selection devices available that would "serve the
employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship' " without the
undesirable racial effect. Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801
(1973)). "Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as
a 'pretext' for discrimination" (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
90. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 426.
91. Id. at 427.
92. Id. at 428.
93. Id.
94. Id. (the national norm for the Wonderlic test was a score of 18).
95. Id. at 428-29.
96. Id. at 429. Further, the record showed that many white incumbents in high-
ranking positions could not pass these tests. Id.
97. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-31 (1975).
98. Id. (citing 29 CFR § 1607). The Guidelines refer to the professional standards of
test validation established by the American Psychological Association. Id. at 431 n.29.
99. Id. at 431 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
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or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated'."'"
Chief Justice Burger, writing separately, dissented on the test-
ing issue, stating that the Court's reliance on Griggs, which gave
"great deference" to the EEOC guidelines, was misplaced.'0 1
Burger argued that the Court had used the EEOC guidelines as a
means of proving job relatedness, instead of evidence of the will of
Congress.10 2 Further, the Chief Justice stated that the guidelines
did not interpret Title VII, nor refer to its legislative history.
Moreover, the guidelines are not administrative law, regardless of
the amount of deference, or "slavish adherence," given them by
the majority.10 3 In sum, the Chief Justice saw the guidelines as just
that; guidelines, not rigid law. Thus, Chief Justice Burger argued
that the EEOC guidelines were to be given no more evidentiary
weight than "other well-founded testimony by experts in the field
of employment testing.' 0 4
The Supreme Court upheld a qualifying test for District of
Columbia police officer positions in Washington v. Davis.0 5 The
100. Id. (quoting 29 CFR § 1607.4(C)). The Supreme Court agreed with the court of
appeals, and remanded the case to the district court in order to precisely fashion the
necessary relief. Id. at 436.
In Albemarle, the Court clarified the standard of job relatedness for the first time since
Griggs. Id. The respondents had not been informed of "their opportunity to present
evidence that even validated tests might be a 'pretext' for discrimination in light of
alternative selection procedures available to the Company." Id. The Court went on to
state that the EEOC guidelines provisionally allowed for the use of tests in limited
circumstances, until new validation studies were available. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.9).
The Supreme Court held that the district court was in the best position to examine that
issue, in that the petitioners would have the chance to present such evidence to a tribunal
applying the defined standard. Id. at 436.
101. Id. at 451 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
102. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 452 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. Chief Justice Burger thought that "[alt the very least, the case should be
remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it reconsider the testing issue,
giving the District Court's findings of fact the deference to which they are entitled." Id. at
453 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
105. 426 U.S. 229, 252 (1976). In April 1970, blacks who had applied for either initial
employment or a promotion within the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, filed suit
alleging that they had been discriminated against by the Department's employment
procedures. Id. at 232. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended the discrimination stemmed
from a series of practices including, but not limited to, a written personnel test which
excluded a disproportionately high number of blacks. Id. at 232-33.
Test 21 in Davis v. Washington was developed by the Civil Service Commission for use
generally throughout the federal service. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C.Cir.
1975). The test was designed to measure verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and
comprehension, rather than to measure the scope of abilities needed to perform the tasks of
a police officer. Id. Applicants were required, along with satisfying other character and
physical standards, to have a high school education, and to have received a raw score of 40
or better on the test. Id. at 956.
The plaintiffs alleged violation of their rights under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and under D.C. Code
§ 1-320. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-33. The district court held that the employment
examination was not discriminatory. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C.
1972). The district court supported its decision by noting that the D.C. Police Department
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Court found that the court of appeals erred in applying the legal
standards applicable to Title VII cases to resolve such a constitu-
tional question.10 6 The Supreme Court stated that it had "never
held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applica-
ble under Title VII." 107 They likewise declined to do so in Davis.
In analyzing the case, the Court declared that even though
the constitutional analysis and Title VII applications were not
interchangeable in their elements, there were common ingredi-
ents.'08 The Supreme Court explained that the "necessary dis-
criminatory racial purpose" need not be expressed in the statute,
and the law's disproportionate impact is not irrelevant in cases
involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.' 0 9
Further, the Court noted that purposeful discrimination may
"often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including
the fact . . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than
another."" However, the Court stated that it had not held that a
law neutral on its face was invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause merely because it had a greater effect on one race as com-
pared to another."'
After distinguishing between the two attacks on discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court examined the facts in Washington. The
Court struggled to understand how a law establishing a racially
neutral employment qualification was nevertheless racially dis-
criminatory, and would deny "'any person ... equal protection of
the laws' " simply by showing a greater ratio of blacks failed to
made strong systematic attempts to recruit blacks to its ranks. Id. at 16. Additionally, the
court stated that the department should not have to lower its standards because more
blacks than whites failed the examination. Id. at 18.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the issue of whether an injunction against
the use of the test was warranted. Davis, 512 F.2d at 965. The appellate court indicated
that the fact that more blacks than whites failed was enough "to show the racially
disproportionate impact of the examination." Id. at 960. Further, the court of appeals
stated that the defendants (the city) had failed to meet their burden of showing job
relatedness. Id. at 965. The fact that the city actively recruited blacks was deemed
irrelevant. Id. at 960-61.
106. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238. "Although the petition for certiorari did not present this
ground for reversal," the Court reversed on these grounds based on the Supreme Court
Rule 40(1XdX2) which provides that the Court "'may notice a plain error not presented.'"
Id.
The defendants presented issues only pertaining to whether Griggs had been
misapplied by the court of appeals. Id. They did not question whether the Griggs and Title
VII standards were even applicable in the case at bar. Id. at 238 n.8.
107. Id. at 239.
108. Id. at 240-42.
109. Id. at 241.
110. Id. at 242.
111. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id.
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qualify as compared to members of other racial or ethnic
groups.'1 2 The Court thought that Test 21 sought to ascertain the
level of verbal skill acquired by prospective employees, and, like
the district court, the Supreme Court held it untenable that the
Constitution prevented the D.C. Government "from seeking...
modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees
rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of
competence."' 
13
Because of this analysis, the Supreme Court held that the dis-
trict court decision for the petitioners and the "federal parties"
should have been affirmed."' The court of appeals reversed the
trial court, stating that the test did not demonstrate a direct rela-
tionship between high scores and training school success, and per-
formance on Test 21 and performance of police work." 5 The
Supreme Court did not agree. Rather, the Court agreed with the
district court, stating that the performance on Test 21 corre-
sponded to the requirements of police training, and that "a posi-
tive relationship between the test and training-course
performance was sufficient to validate the [test], wholly aside from
its possible relationship to actual performance as a police
officer."' " 6 Thus, the Court found that the initial holding by the
district court was not foreclosed by Griggs or Albemarle Paper,
and opted for the "more sensible" job-relatedness requirement."17
112. Id. at 245. This contradicted previous cases expressing a view that proof of a
discriminatory purpose is unnecessary. Id. at 244-45.
113. Id. at 246. The Court reasoned that this is especially true where the position
applied for required a special ability to communicate effectively. Id. The Court added that
plaintiffs could not prevail more successfully on the claim that Test 21 denied them equal
protection than could white applicants who also did not pass. Id. The Court added that the
result would be the same even if there were "proof that more Negroes than whites had
been disqualified by Test 21." Id. Further, the failure of other blacks "would, alone not
demonstrate that respondents individually were being denied equal protection of the laws
by the application of an otherwise valid qualifying test being administered to prospective
police recruits." Id.
However, in Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 223 (5th Cir. 1985), the challenged
requirements were found to be job related. Id. In that case, applicants for police officer
positions "(1) must have completed forty-five semester hours of college credit with at least
a 'C' average at an accredited college or university, (2) must not have a history of 'recent or
excessive marijuana usage.. .', and (3) must not have been 'convicted of' more than three
'hazardous traffic violations' in the twelve months ... preceeding the date of application."
(as "'professional maturity [is] gained through education' "). Id. at 206.
114. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). "The Civil Service Commissioners,
defendants in the District Court, did not petition for writ of certiorari but ... filed a brief as
respondents," as allowed by U.S. Supreme Court Rule 21(4). Id. at 237 n.7. The Court,
therefore, elected to refer to them as the "'federal parties.' " Id.
115. Id. at 249-50.
116. Id. at 250. The Supreme Court reasoned that-this explanation was sufficient, but
noted that it was supported by the regulations of the Civil Service Commission, the opinion
evidence at trial, and the current views of the Civil Service Commissioners (parties to the
case). Id.
117. Id. at 250-51. See also Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 901-02 (5th Cir.
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Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the Court should not
have gone as far as to analyze the differences between the consti-
tutional claim and the Title VII claim because the respondents did
not assert a claim under the Civil Service Act" 8 or under Title
VII.1 19 Brennan reasoned that the Court should not have
addressed statutory issues not presented by the litigants.120 The
Justice argued that judgment of the court of appeals should have
been upheld because the petitioners did not prove that Test 21
was job-related. 121
Justice Brennan's concern was for the effect of future deci-
sions on this point. Washington v. Davis ran against Title VII and
the EEOC guidelines, and thus had the potential of altering the
proper construction of Title VII in future decisions.' 22 Therefore,
Brennan argued that "[s]ound policy considerations" supported
the position that the "petitioners should have been required to
prove that the [tests] either measure[d] job-related skills or pre-
dict[ed] job performance.' 1 23 Further, the holding of the Court,
in Brennan's view, allowed for the dangerous practice of validat-
ing tests that scored applicants on verbal ability and not solely job-
specific verbal ability. Employers now would have an easier time
justifying their entrance examinations.' 2a  Hence, Justice Brennan
argued that the standard set forth by the Court, if not further
defined, and if applied to Title VII, would seriously undermine the
goals of the Act.' 25
Dothard v. Rawlinson 126 added further dimension to the dis-
parate impact test set out in Griggs. The Dothard Court upheld
the district court decision, finding that the plaintiff established a
prima facie case through statistics.127 In discussing the disparate
1979) (holding that a showing of test "validation will rebut the inferences drawn from
statistical evidence of racial discrimination based on work practices").
118. 5 U.S.C. § 3304(aXl) (1988).
119. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 257 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 262. Justice Brennan reviewed the previous Title VII cases, and argued that
a significant relationship to job performance was required to establish the validity of a
discriminatory test. Id. Further, Brennan reasoned that his proposition was supported by
the congressional intent behind Title VII's 1972 amendments, which allowed present case
law to govern where the Act is silent. Id. at 268-69. Brennan argued that the pre-1972 case
law required a discriminatory test to be related to job performance. Id. at 269.
122. Id. at 270.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
127. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977). In Dothard, plaintiff Dianne
Rawlinson sought a position with the Alabama Board of Corrections as a prison guard
(" 'correctional counselor' "). Id. at 323. After her rejection, she instituted a class action suit
under Title VII and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that she was denied the guard position
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impact test, the Court stated that there was "no requirement,
however, that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact
must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual
applicants."'" Plaintiffs in this type of case were "not required to
exhaust every possible source of evidence, if the evidence actually
presented on its face conspicuously demonstrates a job require-
ment's grossly discriminatory impact. ' 12 9 However, the court rea-
soned, if the employer questioned the evidence presented by the
claimant, "he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his
own. "130
Case law states that an employer is not required to choose the
selection device with the least adverse impact on minority appli-
cants.13 1 Rather, the test need only be "valid." An employer's test
that accurately predicts the job performance of an applicant has
"validity.' 3 2 Three types of test validation are contained in the
because of her sex. Id. The district court ruled in her favor. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F.
Supp. 1169, 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1976). In the case sub judice, the prison officials appealed from
that decision. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323.
The Supreme Court stated that a prima facie case is established by a showing of facially
neutral standards which, nevertheless, result in a disproportionate impact on women as a
class. Id. at 329. The findings showed that the height and weight restrictions for
correctional counselor positions set by the Alabama legislature excluded 41.13% of the
female applicants, compared to less than 1% of the males who applied for the positions. Id.
at 330 n.12. The district court found that the statutory height and weight requirements
constituted "the sort of arbitrary barrier to equal employment opportunity that Title VII
forbids." Id. at 328. When Rawlinson applied for the job, she was a 22-year-old college
graduate in the field of correctional psychology. Id. at 323. She was refused the position
because she did not meet the 120-pound minimum weight requirement established by an
Alabama statute, which also imposed a 5'-2" minimum height qualification. Id. at 323-24.
There were also several other qualifications besides the height and weight requirements.
To be eligible an applicant was required to have a valid Alabama driver's license, a high
school education or its equivalent, be free from any physical defects, and be between 20.5
and 45 years of age at the time of appointment. Id. The maximum height of any guard
under the statute was 6'-10" and the maximum weight, 300 pounds. Id. at 324 n.2.
128. Id. at 330.
129. Id. at 331.
130. Id. A "[d]isproportionate impact case can be attacked by demonstrating the
inaccuracy or irrelevancy of the plaintiff's data, as was attempted in Dothard, but most
impact cases are defended on the ground that the challenged practice has a legitimate
business purpose." J. FRIEDMAN AND G. STRICKLER, JR., Tv, LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 229 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION].
131. Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); Guardians
Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of New York, 630 F.2d
79, 110 (2d Cir. 1980). See, e.g., Smith v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 770 F.2d 520,524 (5th Cir.
1985) (test procedures upheld where validation in conformance with the 1978 Uniform
Guidelines).
132. Clady, 770 F.2d at 1430. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
"Validity" refers to the following:
[T]he degree to which a test correlates with a relevant measure or criterion of
job performance. Unless those people who score relatively high on a test are also
likely to perform better on the job, a test lacks validity for that purpose and is
useless for selecting personnel for the job in question.
THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 130, at 253 (citing J. KIRKPAT-
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EEOC guidelines.13 3  Criterion-related validation is the only test
which correlates results with actual work performance. Criterion-
related validity is established by showing that the test measures
abilities which are component parts of jobs, the mastery of which
correlates with some measure of subsequent successful job per-
formance.'1 4 Hence, it is considered preferable to the other meth-
ods that are based on less direct evidence. 13 5
A test possesses content validity if it tests the actual skills or
knowledge used in the job. For example, if a job consisted of mov-
ing sacks of flour from a conveyor belt to a loading dock, a valid
requirement would be that the applicant be physically able to
accomplish that feat.'13 Evidence of the validity of a test by this
RICK, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT 6-7 (1968)). "Validation asks two fundamental
questions. The first asks whether a relationship exists at all. If so, the second question is
whether the relationship is strong enough to be useful." Id. (citing R. M. GUION, PERSON-
NEL TESTING 131 (1965). See, e.g., Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 702 F.2d 567, 568 (5th
Cir. 1983) (employer successfully rebutted a disparate impact claim where tests were found
to have a " 'manifest and legitimate and business relationship to the jobs for which the tests
were used ....... ) (quoting Cormier v. P.P.G. Indust., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211, 281 (W.D. La.
1981)).
133. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 CFR § 1607,
1607.5(A) (1989). However, the Supreme Court has approved validation studies which do
not meet the standards of the Uniform Guidelines. National Education Ass'n v. South
Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978), aff'd mem., United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp.
1094, 1113 n.20 (D.S.C. 1977). See Clady, 770 F.2d at 1430-31; C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS, August 1984, at A-44.
134. See A. SMITH, C. CRAvER, & L. CLARK, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 646
(3d ed. 1988). Two types of criterion validation have been used: concurrent, which is the
procedure employed in Albemarle Paper Co., where the test is administered to persons
already working and their scores compared to supervisory ratings; and predictive, where
tests are administered to new employees but the scores are not used for decision making,
and subsequent job or supervisory ratings are later compared with the scores. See, e.g.,
Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1494, 1501-02 n.4 (E.D. Tex. 1986) modified 841
F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1988). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 428-29
(1975).
135. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912 (5th Cir. 1973). The
court in Georgia Power stated:
The most accurate way to validate an employment test is to administer the
test to be validated to all applicants but proceed to select new employees
without regard for their test achievement, and then, after an appropriate period
of work experience, compare job performance with test scores. An alternative is
"concurrent validation", [sic] a process in which a representative sample of
current employees is rated, then tested, and their scores are compared to their
job ratings.
Id. (citation omitted). See THE LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 130, at
253.
136. See THE LAw OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 130, at 253.
The court in Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 630 F.2d 79, 104 (2d Cir. 1980) stated:
We do not conclude that Title VII requires random selection from among those
who pass a content valid test. In some instances rank-ordering may be shown to
be justified. But where it is not, random selection from within a group validly
determined to have passed a content valid exam is simply an available option.
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method "should consist of data showing that the content of the
selection procedure is representative of important aspects of per-
formance on the job for which the candidates are to be evalu-
ated."'1 37 Further, this means of validation must be grounded on a
job analysis "of the important work behavior(s) required for suc-
cessful performance and their relative importance and, if the
behavior results in work product(s), an analysis of the work
product(s)." 138
Of the three validation methods, construct validation is the
most complex and most difficult to understand. Simply put, identi-
fication of characteristics or traits which are important to success-
ful job performance have construct validity.' 9
In Dothard, the prison officials defended the height and
weight requirements by stating that they were job related - they
had a relationship to strength. 140 However, the Court found that
137. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 130, at 253 (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1607.5(B) (1989)).
138. Id. at 253 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(CX2) (1989)).
"Courts have held that for a test to have content validity, it must measure 'with proper
relevant emphasis all or... most of the essential areas of knowledge and the traits needed
for proper job performance.'" Id. (citation omitted). See also Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Corrections Serv., 374 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, 520 F.2d
420, 431 (2d Cir. 1975) (where the defendants in a class action by black and Hispanic
candidates, challenging state civil service examination for corrections officer sergeant,
failed to prove the job test to be related).
Content validation can be used for tests which seek to measure specific skills or items of
knowledge but is:
not appropriate for demonstrating the validity of selection procedures which
purport to measure traits or constructs, such as intelligence, aptitude,
personality, common sense, judgment, leadership, and spatial ability. Content
validity is also not an appropriate strategy when the selection procedure involves
knowledges [sic], skills, or abilities which an employee will be expected to learn
on the job.
THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 130, at 253 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.14(CX1) (1989)).
139. THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 130, at 254. The EEOC
Guidelines state:
The user should show by empirical evidence that the selection procedure is
validly related to the construct and that the construct is validly related to the
performance of critical or important work behavior(s). The relationship
between the construct as measured by the selection procedure and the related
work behavior(s) should be supported by empirical evidence from one or more
criterion-related studies involving the job or jobs in question....
Id. (citing 29 CFR § 1607.14(DX3). See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 251 n.17
(1976) (indicating the record reflected a validation study of Test 21's relationship to
performance).
140. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). Nonetheless, no evidence was
presented in the district court establishing such a correlation to any extent, and nothing was
exhibited to support the statutory standards. Id. While the suit was pending, the Alabama
Board of Corrections adopted Administrative Regulation 204. Id. at 324-25. This
regulation established gender criteria for guards assigned to "contact positions" in
maximum security institutions. Id. at 325. Rawlinson amended her class action complaint
to include a challenge of that regulation as violating the fourteenth amendment and Title
VII. Id. at 325-26.
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Administrative Regulation 204141 discriminated against women on
the basis of sex.142 While the defendant claimed the requirements
were a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), the Court
stated that the BFOQ was intended as a narrow exception, to be
valid only when "the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.' 43
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in
rejecting this contention by the State, as the regulation did fall
within the narrow ambit of the bona-fide-occupational-qualifica-
tion exception. 44 The essence of a prison guard position is to
maintain prison security. The Court believed that a "woman's rel-
ative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security,
unclassified penitentiary of the type [in] Alabama," with violence
and disorganization, could be directly reduced by her gender.' 45
141. Id. at 324-25. Administrative Regulation 204 stated in part:
4. All correctional counselor I positions will be evaluated to identify and
designate those which require selective certification for appointment of
either a male or female employee. Such positions must fall within a bona
fide occupational qualification stated in Title 4(2)-2000c of the United States
Code.
5. Selective certification from the Correctional Counselor Trainee register will
be requested of the State Personnel Department whenever a position is
being filled which has been designated for either a male or female employee
only.
Dothard v, Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 326.
Further the regulation specified criteria in determining whether the selective certifica-
tion was necessary. Those criteria included:
A. That the presence of the opposite sex would cause disruption of the orderly
running and security of the institution.
B. That the position would require contact with the inmates of the opposite sex
without the presence of others.
C. That the position would require patroling dormitories, restrooms, or show-
ers while in use, frequently, during the day or night.
D. That the position would require search of inmates of the opposite sex on a
regular basis.
E. That the position would require that the Correctional Counselor trainee not
be armed with a firearm.
Meith v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1175-76 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
142. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332.
143. Id. at 333 (quoting Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388
(5th Cir. 1971)) (emphasis in original).
144. Id. at 334. See also E.E.O.C. v Kentucky State Police Dep't, 860 F.2d 665, 669
(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989). The court in that case held that a mandatory
retirement age of 55 was not a BFOQ for employment as a state police officer, where the
State Police did not regularly test for aerobic or cardiovascular fitness of officers and allowed
officers who had suffered heart attacks or undergone bypass surgery to remain on the force.
E.E.O.C. v. Kentucky State Police Dept., 860 F.2d at 667-69. Further, the preliminary
considerations in an age-based qualification, purportedly justified by safety interest are
whether the job qualification is "'reasonably necessary" to the normal operation of the
business; and whether the employer is compelled to rely on a proxy for the safety-related
job qualification validated in the first inquiry. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,
412-17 (1985).
145. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335. The Court reasoned that an expectation existed that
sex offenders who have criminally assaulted women in the past would be moved to do so
again" if they had access to women. Id. Also, the Court noted that there would be a real
64 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:39
These earlier opinions of the Supreme Court made it evident that
neither the McDonnell Douglas analysis nor the Griggs model
could be viewed totally independent of the other.146  As the
Supreme Court stated, "[e]ither theory may, of course, be applied
to a particular set of facts."'1 47 This instigated a growth of this
model - the expansion of the disparate impact analysis to include
discrimination by subjective criteria.14 8 In Watson v. Forth Worth
Bank & Trust,'49 this disparate impact argument was used after
the McDonnell Douglas test failed.'50
III. INTRODUCTION TO WATSON v FORT WORTH BANK
& TRUST
The plaintiff in Watson, Clara Watson, was hired in August of
1973 by Fort Worth Bank & Trust (the Bank) as a proof opera-
tor.15 ' Two years later, she was promoted to the position of teller
trainee, and after a three month period, became the motor bank
teller.15 2 After being transferred to the Bank's main lobby, Wat-
son was again promoted to the position of commercial teller in
February of 1980.15 The next year Watson applied and was
denied promotion for four separate positions with the Bank. 54 In
risk of assault from other inmates who were deprived of normal heterosexual activity. Id.
Interestingly, if the reasoning of the Court were inverted, that is, if the prison was run
efficiently and safely (without risk to the prison guards), women would be qualified to fill the
positions. Thus, women were excluded because of the risk of harm to them in a dangerous,
poorly administrated prison, not because of a valid BFOQ in the job description. Id. at 341-
42 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 141 supra.
See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (holding that the administration
of four written examinations for promotions was the type of practice intended to be
included in Title VII as a "barrier" to employment opportunities). For further analysis of
Teal, see J. Rigler, Connecticut v. Teal: The Supreme Court's Latest Exposition of Disparate
Impact Analysis, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (1984).
146. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
Several lower courts intimated that this notion, expressed by the Supreme Court in
Teamsters implied that the discriminatory treatment and disparate impact theories are
interchangeable without regard to the nature of the claim. For example in Atonio v. Wards
Cove Packing Co., the Ninth Circuit held that disparate impact analysis could be applied in
Title VII employment discrimination cases to challenge subjective employment practices.
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985) withdrawn, 787
F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985).
147. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, n.15. See generally Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co.,
690 F.2d 88, 92 (6th Cir. 1982) (both theories may be properly pleaded in plaintiff's Title
VII complaint, and, if sufficiently supported by the evidence, both may also be submitted to
the trier of fact and utilized as a basis for relief. Moreover, plaintiff need not elect between
the two at any time.). Id.
148. Defining the Proper Bounds of Disparate Impact, supra note 9, at 668-75.
149. 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986).
150. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1986).
151. Id. at 793.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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January 1981, Watson took a leave of absence in order to have foot
surgery, and she applied for two of the promotions during this
leave. 155 Watson did not return to work after that, and resigned in
August of 1981.156 After the exhaustion of her administrative rem-
edies, Watson instituted an employment discrimination action,
alleging that the Bank discriminated against her and others simi-
larly situated on the basis of race, violating 42 U.S.C. section 1981
and Title VII.15 7
The district court held first that, although Watson demon-
strated a prima facie case of discrimination, she failed to demon-
strate that the Bank's articulated reasons for failing to promote her
were merely pretext.'58 The court examined the statistical evi-
dence presented by Watson and discovered that "the percentage
of blacks in the Bank's work force mirrored the percentage of
blacks" in the county and the Fort Worth metropolitan area. 15 9
Watson appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 61 In a
review of Watson's individual claim of discrimination, the appel-
late court agreed with the district court's analysis under the
McDonnell Douglas discriminatory treatment model, rather than
an analysis using the disparate impact model. 16 ' However, the
court of appeals stated that the great amount of statistics
presented by the plaintiff was not irrelevant even under the dis-
criminatory treatment theory. 162 Accordingly, the appellate court
reasoned that the statistics could be relevant at the initial stage of
the litigation in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 63
Further, the court stated that statistics could be relevant at the
third stage, "when the plaintiff is attempting to prove that the rea-
sons proffered by the defendant for its action are either unworthy
of credence or mere pretexts for discrimination.' 64 But in its final
analysis, the court of appeals saw no grounds for overturning the
district court's decision where primary emphasis was based on the
comparative experience of those promoted over Watson and
155. Watson, 798 F.2d at 794.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The district court did find that Watson had not established a prima facie case
of discriminatory treatment. Id. at 799. However, the court stated that the bank had
presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the promotions for which
Watson had applied and was denied. Id.
159. Id.
160. Watson, 798 F.2d at 795.
161. Id. at 797-98.
162. Id. at 798.
163. Id. at 798 n.13.
164. Id. at 798 (citation omitted).
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arguably very little in the subjective evaluations. 165
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the court of
appeals,"6 limited to the following question:
Whether an employer's practice of committing employ-
ment decisions to the wholly subjective discretion of its
supervisors which adversely affects minority employees
may be tested under the disparate impact theory of proof
of employment discrimination recognized by this Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)?167
IV. WATSON: THEORIES PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME
COURT
Clara Watson presented eight separate arguments on the sin-
gle question granted by the Supreme Court.168 In sum, she argued
that Griggs did not restrict the disparate impact analysis to objec-
tive tests. Citing legislative history and congressional choice, Wat-
son argued that the goal of the 1964 legislation was to "combat the
discriminatory effects whether they be from subjective or objec-
tive procedures.' 1 69 Watson also stated that unlawful discrimina-
tion "embedded in subjective decision-making processes may be
impossible to prove" under the alternative McDonnell Douglas
test because "covert discrimination may then be hidden among
dozens of possible considerations, all facially neutral, and far too
numerous to possibly rebut.' 7 0 Further, Watson argued that the
subjective but discriminatory selection system, protected from the
disparate impact analysis and lacking the evidentiary intent to be
established under the discriminatory treatment test, would create
an "ad hoc discriminatory quota system contrary to the clear pur-
pose of Title VII to eliminate the effects of racial discrimination in
the workplace."' 7 ' In addition, Watson argued that requiring the
165. Watson, 798 F.2d at 799.
166. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 481 U.S. 1012 (1987).
167. Brief for Petitioner Watson at i, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
2000 (1988) (No. 86-6139) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. The Court limited certiorari to
this question.
168. Id. at ii-iii.
169. Id. at 13. Watson also stated that according to Griggs the EEOC Guidelines are to
be given "great deference." Id. See supra text accompanying note 99. See also U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38295, 38308 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q)).
170. Brief for Petitioner supra note 167, at 13.
171. Id. For further discussion on subjective criteria, see Comment, Application of the
Adverse Impact Analysis to Subjective Criteria in Title VII Employment Discrimination
Cases, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1986); Note, Evaluation of Subjective Selection Systems in
Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases: A Misuse of Disparate Impact Analysis, 7
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employer to validate a subjective selection process would not
unduly burden the employer, unlike the burden of the employee
to demonstrate a significantly disparate impact through
statistics. 172
The defendant, Fort Worth Bank & Trust, presented five
arguments in its appellate brief to the Supreme Court. In essence,
the Bank argued that an expansion of Griggs was unwarranted and
inappropriate. 173 The disparate impact analysis, according to the
Bank, was only appropriate for analyzing employment criteria
which are applied to all applicants mechanically and without
exception. Further, the Bank proposed that the discriminatory
treatment and disparate impact theories are not interchangea-
ble, 174 and that the discriminatory treatment analysis was the
appropriate theory under which to analyze the application of sub-
jective employment criteria. 175 Finally, the Bank argued that the
threat by employers clearly contradicted the intent of Congress in
the drafting of the Civil Rights Act.'7 6
V. WATSON: DECISION AND ANALYSIS
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion in Watson,
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and Scalia
joined in part.' 77 In a decision that split the Court 4-3-1, the
O'Connor plurality agreed with the thrust of the arguments of
plaintiff Watson. The Court held that the disparate impact analy-
CARDOZo L. REV. 549 (1986); Note, Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective
Employee Selection Procedures, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 375 (1987).
172. Brief for Petitioner supra note 167, at 13-14.
173. Brief for Respondent Bank at 6, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
1000 (1988) (No. 86-6139) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
174. Id. The Bank distinguished Teamsters, in which the Supreme Court held that
both theories may be applied to a particular set of facts, by stating that the theories are not
interchangeable to all sets of facts. Id. (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977)). See Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1982)
(to prevail, plaintiff need only demonstrate lack of objective criteria and disparity in job
promotions, and that he or she would have been the most qualified individual for the job or
show the presence of discriminatory intent).
The Bank's position was similar to the ruling in Talley v. United States Postal Service,
720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983). In Talley, the court held that "'a subjective decision-making
system... cannot alone form the foundation for a discriminatory impact case.'" Id. at 507
(quoting Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609,611 (8th Cir. 1981)). The plaintiff in Talley
contended that the subjective decision-making by a predominantly white-supervisor force
disproportionately affected blacks and females. Id. The court deemed this to be
insufficient; rather, plaintiff was required to point to a facially neutral employment practice
that operates in a discriminatory manner. Id.
175. Brief for Respondent at 7. Both Watson and the Bank's motion for judgment were
denied on remand from the Supreme Court by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 856 F.2d 716 (1988).
176. Brief for Respondent, supra note 173 at 7. See supra note 2 for a discussion of
Congressional intent behind the act.
177. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 982 (1988).
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sis could be applied to subjective employment practices.17 8 The
Bank had argued that if disparate impact analysis is used in subjec-
tive criteria promotion, the plaintiff will have an easy time estab-
lishing a prima facie case through the use of bare statistics.' 7 9 The
Court recognized that the "inevitable focus" on statistics in dispa-
rate impact cases could tempt employers to adopt "inappropriate
prophylactic measures," clearly contradictory to the intent of Con-
gress in drafting the Civil Rights Act.' 80 However, Justice
O'Connor stated that it was "completely unrealistic" to believe
that lawful discrimination was the "sole cause" of people applying
for certain positions according to the laws of chance."8 ' Further, it
was also unrealistic to direct employers to "eliminate, or discover
and explain" the numerous causes of innocent statistical imbal-
ances in the employer's work force. 182 The effect of the Court's
decision was to create a potential Hobson's choice for employers,
leading to perverse results in practice.' 83 The Court sought to
avoid a situation where quotas and preferential treatment became
the only cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and
potentially serious liability.'8 4
In the second section of her opinion, Justice O'Connor
explained the establishment of a prima facie case under the dispa-
rate impact theory. The employee's burden in establishing a
prima facie case extended "beyond the need to show statistical dis-
parities in the employer's work force.' 8s5 Further, the employee
was required, in O'Connor's opinion, to identify the specific
employment practice which was to be challenged.' 86
178. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) (Justices Rehnquist,
White, and Scalia joined in Parts I-C and II-D).
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)).
181. Id. at 992 (citing Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 489 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Id. Congress specifically provided that employers were not required to explain
such disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
183. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993. A Hobson's choice is defined "as an apparently free
choice when there is no real alternative." Thomas Hobson, an English liveryman who died
1631, required every patron to take the horse closest to the door or no horse at all.
WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 864 (Deluxe 2d ed 1983).
184. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993. Joseph Sellers, Washington Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, stated that the Court's decisions in Watson, Wards Cove, and Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), revealed that "[tihe current conservative
majority shows discomfort with cases attacking subtle discrimination or discrimination that
has to be proved inferentially or by statistical evidence, such as disparate impact suits."
Coyle, How Far Will the Court Go?, NAT'L L. J., June 26, 1989, at 46, col. 4. According to
Sellers, this discomfort was evident in justice O'Connor's opinions in these cases. Id. Sellers
predicted that heavy reliance on statistical evidence to prove discrimination will force
employers into using quotas to avoid suits. Id.
185. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994.
186. Id. The O'Connor plurality stated that although specific employment practices
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Next, the causation needed to be proven. Justice O'Connor
explained that the employee must offer statistical evidence suffi-
cient to show that the employer's questioned practice caused "the
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected group. "187 The statistical disparities
must be "sufficiently substantial" to raise "an inference of causa-
tion."' The statistical evidence presented by the plaintiff may be
rebutted by the defendant's own statistics.'8 9
A second limitation outlined by O'Connor in applying the dis-
parate impact theory lies in the defense of" 'business necessity'"
or "'job-relatedness.'"190 While the employer has the burden
demonstrating that the employment requirements have a "mani-
fest relationship" to the job in question, the Court did not imply
that the ultimate burden of proof should be shifted to the defend-
ant. 9 ' Rather, the burden of proving discrimination against a pro-
tected class in a subjective or discretionary promotion system
remains on the plaintiff.'9 2 With that caveat, the plurality held
that the disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective or
were relatively easy in challenges to standardized tests, it may be more difficult when
subjective criteria are at issue, or where there is a combination of "subjective criteria" and
the use of more "rigid standardized rules or tests." Id. (citing as cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 456 (1982)).
187. Id. at 994.
188. Id. at 995. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (requirements
operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than white applicants); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (plaintiffs required to show "that the tests in
question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different
from that of the pool of applicants"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976)
("when hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate
numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved"); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S 321, 329 (1977) (facially neutral employment standards "select
applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern"); New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) ("statistical evidence showing that an
employment practice has the effect of denying members of one race equal access to
employment opportunities"); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) ("significantly
discriminatory impact").
189. Watson, 487 U.S. at 996 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the result and concurring in part) (opportunity to challenge plaintiff's
evidence is available to the defendant employer as in any other lawsuit).
190. Id. at 997.
191. Id. The Court reiterated that employers are not required to introduce formal
"validation studies," even when defending standardized or objective tests, to show that
"particular criteria predict actual on-the-job performance." Id. at 998. See generally,
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587, n.31; Davis, 426 U.S. at 250, 256 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. The Court stated:
[Wihen a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and when
the defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that its employment
practices are based on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff must 'show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.'
Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425).
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discretionary promotion systems. 193
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. 19 Blackmun agreed that the dis-
parate impact analysis should be "applied to claims of discrimina-
tion caused by subjective or discretionary selection processes. "195
However, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the plurality's charac-
terization of the nature and allocation of the claimant and defend-
ant's burdens proving and rebutting disparate impact claims.'
Specifically, Blackmun argued that the allocation of the bur-
dens of proof set out in the plurality opinion contradicted the past
decisions of the Court in disparate impact cases.197  Blackmun
agreed with the plurality that the plaintiff has the initial burden to
show that a facially neutral hiring practice "'select[s] applicants
... in a significantly discriminatory pattern.' "198 However, once a
plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case, Blackmun
believed that the burden of proof, not production, shifted to the
employer to establish that the business practice in question was a
business necessity.' 99 Further, Blackmun argued that the plural-
ity's allocation incorrectly resembled the discriminatory treatment
burdens of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, rather than past dis-
parate impact cases.200
In the discriminatory treatment analysis, the prima facie case
is insufficient to shift the burden of proving a lack of discrimina-
tory intent to the defendant 20 ' where a disparate impact caused
by an employment practice is directly established by numerical
disparity. 2  Blackmun criticized the plurality opinion for omit-
ting the distinction between the two theories in its analysis, and
for holding employers to such a weak burden of production.20 3
Under the plurality's burden, an employer accused of discriminat-
ing intentionally need only dispute that it had any such intent by
193. Id. at 999.
194. Id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Blackmun's opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Id.
195. Id.
196. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000.
197. Id. at 1001.
198. Id. (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977)).
199. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
200. Id. at 1001. According to Blackmun, the plurality turns a "blind eye" to the
-crucial distinction" between the two types of claims. Id. at 1002. See supra notes 9 and
171 for a partial list of recent law reviews on the subject.
201. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1004 (1988) (Blackmun J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
202. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
in original).
203. Id.
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offering any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, as in McDon-
nell Douglas.2 °4 This justification, Blackmun said, is not sufficient
"to legitimatize a practice that has the effect of excluding a pro-
tected class from job opportunities at a significantly disproportion-
ate rate.12 0 5 Blackmun stated that such a result runs afoul of Title
VII and stare decisis unless it was "necessary to safe and efficient
job performance. "206 To be justified as a necessity, the job criteria
must directly relate to a prospective employee's ability to perform
the job effectively.2 °7 Justice Blackmun concluded that an
employer is liable under Title VII if the employer relied upon an
employment selection process that disadvantages a protected
class, unless the employer could show that the process was neces-
sary to fulfill legitimate business requirements.2 °8 Justice Black-
mun argued that the plurality's opinion, which stated that the
employer did not bear the burden of making this showing, cannot
be reconciled with prior impact cases. 20 9 Reminding the plurality
of the holding of Griggs, Blackmun stated that employment prac-
tices "'fair in form, but discriminatory in operation'" are intolera-
ble under Title VII.21 0  According to Blackmun, the lesson of
Griggs should be retained and remembered, even though the "fair
form" is a subjective one. 11
Justice Stevens, in his short concurrence, agreed that the
question presented on certiorari should be answered affirma-
tively.21 2 However, like Justice Blackmun, Stevens thought it
unwise to announce a "fresh" interpretation of the prior disparate
impact cases in applying the analysis to subjective employment
criteria.2 13 There were too many variables, in Justice Stevens'
204. Id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1005 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332, n.14 (1977)).
"Allowing an employer to escape liability simply by articulating vague, inoffensive-
sounding subjective criteria would disserve Title VII's goal of eradicating discrimination in
employment." Id. at 1009.
207. Id. at 1005.
208. Id. at 1008. Justice Blackmun stated: "Indeed, to the extent an employer's
normal' practices serve to perpetuate a racially disparate status quo, they clearly violate
Title VII unless they can be shown to be necessary, in addition to being 'normal.'" Id.
209. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1006. In criticizing the Court's easing of the burden on the
defendant, Justice Blackmun declared: "the less defined the particular criteria involved, or
the system relied upon to assess these criteria, the more difficult it may be for a reviewing
court to assess the connection between the selection process and job performance." Id. at
1009. One of the hiring supervisors in Watson testified that she was never given any
guidelines or instructions to assist her in her hiring and promotion decisions. Id. at 1009
n.7.
210. Id. at 1010-11 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
211. Id. at 1011.
212. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
213. Watson, 487 U.S. at 1011.
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view, to adequately discuss that portion of the analysis which was
not the focus of the Court's review. 1 4 The proper procedure for
that question, according to Stevens, was to postpone any further
discussion on the evidentiary standards until after the district
court had made the required findings in the plaintiff's prima facie
case.
2 15
VI. DISCUSSION OF WATSON
The plurality decision in Watson, and the intentions of the
other Justices, created a precarious and uneasy standard for appli-
cation, with questionable long term effects. 2 16 Some authors have
argued that the future does not hold success for claimants of dis-
crimination caused by subjective criteria.2 1 The immediate result
of Watson was that the plaintiff could satisfy her burden of proof
more easily, hence increasing chances of proving the discrimina-
tion claim on remand. Further, adoption of the analysis in Watson
makes an employers' burden of showing the job-relatedness of the
employment practice to be one of production of the evidence
rather than persuasion. As a result, plaintiffs will be forced to
carry the burden of proof throughout the entire action - a burden
that constitutes an even larger barrier than if the plaintiff could
have alleged illegal discrimination under the discriminatory treat-
ment model. 18
It is not entirely clear from Watson whether the Court
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Bergal v. Metropolitan Waste Control Comm'n, 873 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir.
1989) (on remand, the court was instructed to reconsider subjective criteria in light of
Watson); Perez v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 707 F. Supp. 891, 901 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (to
be useful in employment discrimination cases, "[s]tatistical disparities must be sufficiently
substantial that they raise ... an inference of causation") (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988)).
217. Mertens, supra note 10, at 172. Contra Kandel, Current Developments in
Employment Litigation: Burden of Proof in Watson: A Major Shift in Disparate Impact
Litigation?, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 263, 275 (1988) (concluding that Watson provides
favorable precedent for plaintiff-claimants on burden of proof). Post-Watson cases
illustrate that claimants may not succeed on their claims by applying subjective criteria.
See, e.g., Stephen v. PGA Sheraton Resort, Ltd., 873 F.2d 276, 280-81 (11th Cir. 1989)
(employer successfully rebutted Watson prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination
in purchasing clerk position at hotel); Cox v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 222-23 (7th Cir.
1989) (fire department captain examinations and promotions failed to satisfy Watson
analysis).
218. See infra notes 224-79 and accompanying text for discussion of the holding of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See also Willis v. Watson
Chapel School Dist., 703 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (female teacher established that the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons offered by school officials for not hiring her for eight
different administrative positions were pretext for discrimination, thus entitling her to
relief).
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wanted to place this great a burden on plaintiffs. 1 Some of the
Justices obviously wanted to restrict the approach. ° Others were
unsure of the effect of the restated disparate impact test which
they were empowered to create. 2 In challenging a specific
employment practice through statistics, the Supreme Court
placed a greater burden on the claimant. With this burden on the
plaintiff, perhaps a balance can be struck against the burden of the
employers in forming requirements that do not run afoul of Title
VII. Perhaps the plaintiff's burden balances the conflicting analy-
sis of the members of the Court. If Watson's message was to direct
employers to define their job requirements in more generic and
euphemistic terms, the result does not appear to be a drastic set-
back for those defendants. From Watson, arguably, employers
must show only that the practices implemented are normal and
legitimate. Watson does not require a showing of job-relatedness,
as was required by Griggs.2 2 2 This leaves the plaintiff with the
heavy task of proving discriminatory impact through a specific
practice and affixing causation by the employer through statistical
evidence.
If this is the desired effect of Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, it must not last long, as it significantly reduces the persua-
sive value of the EEOC guidelines and the prima facie case, as set
out in Griggs."'3 This expansion of the disparate impact analysis to
the subjective employment case exacts a heavy price from the
plaintiff attempting to prove unlawful discrimination.
VII. WARDS COVE PACKING COMPANY v. ATONO, INC.
The half-life of Watson was determined by Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, Inc.224 The Wards Cove Court, like the Watson
219. See supra text and accompanying notes 177-215 for analysis of the Watson
holding. See also Larkin v. Pullman-Standard Div., Pullman, Inc., 854 F.2d 1549, 1584
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, vacated, 110 S.Ct. 316 (1989).
220. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 177-215 and accompanying text.
222. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Griggs Court required that the
discriminatory practices be job-related. Id.
223. See Kandel, supra note 217, at 272.
224. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The district court, in Wards Cove, held a bench trial in which
172 findings of fact were entered. Id. at 648. All of the workers' discriminatory treatment
claims were rejected. Id. The court believed the subjective criteria were not under attack
by use of the disparate impact theory and rejected the disparate impact challenges used by
the employer to fill the noncannery positions. Id. The court also found the packing
company's "'objective' employment practices (e.g., an English language requirement,
alleged nepotism in hiring, failure to post noncannery openings, the rehire preference,
etc.)" could be challenged under a disparate impact theory, but rejected the claims for
failure of proof. Id.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on appeal. Atonio v. Wards
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Court, was divided on the appropriate evidentiary standards.
Wards Cove was a dispute brought by a class of former Alaska
salmon cannery workers charging three companies with employ-
ment discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII. 225 This
decision brightened and defined the holding of Watson.226 The
Wards Cove Court made it more difficult for minorities to use sta-
tistics to prevail on claims of racial discrimination in employment,
and made it substantially easier for employers to rebut allegations
of such discrimination. The employees in Wards Cove alleged a
variety of discriminatory hiring and promotion practices, includ-
ing "nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring crite-
ria, separate hiring channels, [and] a practice of not promoting
from within."2 2 7 The minority workers of Wards Cove Packing,
Native Alaskans and Filipinos, were given the unskilled positions
("cannery jobs"), and the whites were given the skilled and better
paying jobs ("noncannery jobs,).22 8 Thus, Wards Cove presented
the Court with another opportunity to define succinctly the future
of the disparate impact analysis.
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in Wards Cove,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy.2 29 This majority reversed the decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 230 declaring "that a comparison between
the percentage of cannery workers who are nonwhite and the per-
centage of noncannery workers who are nonwhite [does not make]
out a prima facie case of disparate impact."
23
'
Cove Packing Co., Inc., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the opinion was
withdrawn when the court of appeals agreed to hear the case en banc. Atonio v. Wards
Cove Packing Co., Inc., 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985). The en banc court of appeals had to
determine whether subjective hiring practices could be challenged using the disparate
impact model. The court held, as the Supreme Court subsequently held in Watson, that the
disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjective employment practices, provided
the plaintiffs have proved a causal connection between those practices and the
demonstrated impact on the members of a protected class. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing
Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1477, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987). The en banc court of appeals remanded the
case to a court of appeals panel to reconsider the district court's ruling.
On remand, the panel of the appellate court applied the en banc ruling and held that
the workers had established a prima facie case of disparate impact employment
discrimination in hiring for both skilled and unskilled noncannery positions. Atonio v.
Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 827 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1987). The panel remanded the
case to the district court. Id. at 450.
225. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989). The thrust of the
plaintiffs' case focused on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) which prohibits unlawful employment
practices. See text accompanying note 3, supra.
226. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (the Court disagreed on
the proper evidentiary standards).
227. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 644.
230. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987).
231. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 655. The Court noted that under the appellate court's
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By relying solely on the workers' statistics which showed "a
high percentage of nonwhite workers in the cannery jobs and a
low percentage of such workers in the noncannery positions," the
court of appeals misapplied Supreme Court precedent.232 Instead,
the majority stated that the "'proper comparison [is] between the
racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial comparison of
the qualified . .. population in the relevant labor market.' "233
Upon this analysis, the Court found the comparison of skilled non-
cannery jobs with the composition of the cannery force "in no way
reflected 'the pool of qualified job applicants' or the 'qualified pop-
ulation in the labor force.' "234 Thus, the employer's selection
methods or employment practices could not have had a disparate
impact on nonwhites where the absence of nonwhites holding
such skilled jobs reflected a "dearth" of qualified minority appli-
cants for reasons that were not the employer's fault.235
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals also erred
concerning the unskilled positions. The Court stated:
Racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's work
force does not, without more, establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact with respect to the selection of work-
ers for the employer's other positions, even where work-
ers for the different positions may have somewhat
fungible skills (as is arguably the case for cannery and
unskilled noncannery workers).236
analysis, nonwhites would be successful in establishing as prima facie case under Title VII
where they comprised 52% of the cannery workers at any given cannery. Id. at 642.
232. Id. at 650. The Court observed that statistics alone could sometimes establish a
prima facie case, but that was not the case here. Id. (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299, 307-08 (1977)).
233. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308). Further, the
Court stated, "[ailternatively, in cases where such labor market statistics will be difficult if
not impossible to ascertain, we have recognized that certain other statistics - such as
measures indicating the racial composition of 'otherwise-qualified applicants' for at-issue
jobs - are equally probative for this purpose." Id. (citing New York City Transit Authority
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979)).
234. Id. at 651 (emphasis in original). The Court observed:
Measuring alleged discrimination in the selection of accountants, managers, boat
captains, electricians, doctors, and engineers - and the long list of other 'skilled'
noncannery positions found to exist by the District Court by comparing the
number of nonwhites occupying these jobs to the number of nonwhites filling
cannery worker positions is nonsensical.
Id. (citations omitted).
235. Id.
236. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 653. The Court further stated that:
[I]solating the cannery workers as the potential 'labor force' for unskilled
noncannery positions is at once both too broad and too narrow in its focus. It is
too broad because the vast majority of these cannery workers did not seek jobs in
unskilled noncannery positions; there is no showing that many of them would
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:39
Moreover, the Court explained that, provided there were "no
barriers or practices deterring qualified nonwhites from apply-
ing," the employer's selection mechanism "probably" did not have
a disparate impact on minorities "if the percentage of qualified
applicants who are nonwhite is not significantly less than the per-
centage of qualified applicants who are nonwhite.... "237 In such
circumstances, the Court noted that the percentage of nonwhite
workers found in the employer's labor force would be irrelevant to
a prima facie statistical disparate impact case.23 8 The Court
declared that such a result could not be reconciled with its previ-
ous decisions or with the goals of the civil rights statute. 39
Under the theory of the court of appeals, an employer with a
racial imbalance in part of its labor force could be exposed to liti-
gation, and "forced to engage in the expensive and time-consum-
ing task of defending the 'business necessity'" of its selection
methods for other members of its work force.24° In such circum-
stances, under the majority view, the only practicable option for
employers would be to adopt racial quotas to insure that no por-
tion of its work force deviated in racial composition from the other
portions of the work force - a result prohibited by the drafters of
Title VII.241
Justice White opined that the question of causation was cor-
have done so even if none of the arguably 'deterring' practices existed. Thus, the
pool of cannery workers cannot be used as a surrogate for the class of qualifiedjob applicants because it contains many persons who have not (and would not) be
noncannery job applicants. Conversely, if respondents propose to use the
cannery workers for comparison purposes because they represent the 'qualified
labor population' generally, the group is too narrow because there are obviously
many qualified persons in the labor market for noncannery jobs who are not
cannery workers.
Id. at 653-54.
237. Id. at 653. The Court qualified its conclusion in a footnote by "observing that it is
only 'probable' that there has been no disparate impact on minorities in such circumstances
- because bottom-line racial balance is not a defense under Title VII." Id. at n.8 (citing
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982)). The Supreme Court concluded that even if the
employer "could show that the percentage of selected applicants who are nonwhite is not
significantly less than the percentage of qualified applicants who are nonwhite," the
workers still would have a Title VII case, provided they established that a hiring practice
had a disparate impact on minorities, "notwithstanding the bottom-line racial balance in
[the cannery's] work force." Id. (citing Teal, 457 U.S. at 450).
238. Id. at 653.
239. Id.
240. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652.
241. Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 922-94 (1988) and
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)). See also Fein & Reynolds, Putting
Civil Rights on a Fair Course, Legal Times, June 19, 1989, at 18, col. 1. "Not lost on the
[Wards Cove]... majority was the fact that racial quotas were just what Senator Hubert
Humphrey and his co-architects of Title VII repeatedly and heatedly disavowed during the
1963-1964 legislative debates." Id. at 21, col. 1. See note 4, supra.
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rectly stated by Justice O'Connor in Watson.242 Specifically, the
claimant must show more than statistical disparity in the
employer's work force, in that " '[t]he plaintiff must begin by iden-
tifying the specific employment practice that is challenged.'"243
The Court stated that "even the Court of Appeals... noted that 'it
is... essential that the practices identified by the cannery workers
be linked causally with the demonstrated adverse impact.' 1244
The Court found that the showing of the application of a spe-
cific employment practice "is an integral part of the plaintiff's
prima facie case. ' '1 4 5 Thus, even if the plaintiffs established that
nonwhites were under-represented in the at-issue jobs in a man-
ner acceptable under the standards set out by the Court,246 such a
showing alone would not establish a prima facie case. In addition,
the Court noted that the plaintiffs in Wards Cove must demon-
strate that the alleged disparity is derived from one or more of the
employment practices brought before the Supreme Court. 47
On remand, the Supreme Court directed the district court to
require the workers to demonstrate, as part of their prima facie
case, that the statistical disparity complained of was the result of
one of the employment practices alleged to be illegal.248 The
workers were required to specifically show that each challenged
practice had a significantly disparate impact on employment
opportunities for both whites and nonwhites.249 The Court justi-
242. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989).
243. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). The
Watson Court also noted that this requirement was especially true where the employee
alleged the use of subjective criteria along with rigid standardized rules or examinations.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 994. Moreover, the Wards Cove Court commented:
Our disparate-impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular
hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities. Just as an
employer cannot escape liability under Title VII by demonstrating that, 'at the
bottom line,' his work force is racially balanced (where particular hiring
practices may operate to deprive minorities of employment opportunities), a
Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact simply by
showing that, 'at the bottom line,' there is racial imbalance in the work force.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
244. Id. (citing Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 827 F.2d 439, 445 (9th Cir.
1987).
245. Id. at 657.
246. See supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
247. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989). Justice White
stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would result in employers being potentially liable for 'the
myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their
work forces.'" Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988)).
248. Id. at 658.
249. Id. The Court noted that the "peculiar" facts of the case significantly illustrated
why a comparison between the percentage of nonwhite cannery workers was an improper
basis for presenting a prima facie claim of disparate impact. Id. at 654. The district court
found that nonwhites were overrepresented among cannery workers because the cannery
contracted with a union, Local 37, that consisted predominantly of nonwhites. Id.
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fled this requirement as not burdensome and cited liberal discov-
ery rules which would allow broad access to the employer's
records.250 At the same time, employers falling within the scope
of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
were required to maintain records disclosing the impact of tests
and selection procedures on employment opportunities of persons
by identifiable race, sex, or ethnic group.25 '
If the cannery workers, on remand, establish a prima facie
case under the newly formed criteria (with respect to any of the
employer's practices), the burden of producing evidence of legiti-
mate business justification for such practices would then shift to
the employer.252 However, the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with the claimants at all times.253 Further, the majority
boldly declared that "to the extent that... [some of this Court's
decisions] speak of an employer's 'burden of proof' with respect to
a legitimate business justification defense, they should have been
understood to mean an employer's production - but not persua-
sion - burden. 254
The Court concluded by noting that, even if the employees
could not persuade the district court on the business necessity
Therefore, if the cannery stopped using the union as its hiring channel for cannery
positions, it was apparent (according to the di'trict court) that the racial stratification
amounted to statistical insignificance. Id.
Thus, under the approach of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, according to the
Supreme Court, it was "possible that with no change whatsoever in their hiring practices for
noncannery workers," the cannery could make the workers' prima facie case of disparate
impact "disappear" (emphasis in original). Id.
Further, the Court stated, if there was no prima facie case of disparate impact in the
selection of noncannery workers, without the cannery's use of the specific union to hire
cannery workers, the employer's reliance on Local 37 to fill the cannery jobs, not at-issue in
the dispute, (and its resulting "overrepresentation" of nonwhites in those positions) did not,
alone, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. Id. This was exactly the result the
court of appeals reached below. Id. at 655.
250. Id. at 657.
251. Id. "Plaintiffs as a general matter will have the benefit of these tools to meet their
burden of showing a causal link between challenged employment practices and racial
imbalances in the work force .... " Id.
252. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
253. Id. at 660 (emphasis added). The Wards Cove majority stated that this standard
conforms with the usual method. Allocating persuasion and production burdens in the
federal courts and with the rule set out in past disparate impact cases, such as Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981). Id.
254. Id. (citation omitted). The Court explained:
A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will not suffice, because such a
low standard of review would permit discrimination to be practiced through the
use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices. At the same time,
though, there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or
'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster: this degree of
scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, and would
result in a host of evils we have identified above.
Id. at 659. See supra note 34 for a discussion of relative burdens in Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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question, they still could prevail by producing alternatives that
reduced the disparate impact of the canneries' current practices,
provided such alternatives were equally effective in achieving the
employer's legitimate employment goals in light of the alterna-
tives' costs and other burdens. 255 If these proposed alternatives
are equally effective, the employer's refusal to adopt them would
belie a claim that the practices were being used for nondiscrimina-
tory reasons.25 6
Justice Stevens wrote a vehement dissent, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.25 7 In Stevens' view, the major-
ity opinion disregarded the holding of Griggs.258 Justice Stevens
chided the majority and validated his stand by declaring that Chief
Justice Burger's landmark opinion in Griggs established that an
employer may violate Title VII "even when acting in complete
faith without any invidious intent. ' 259  From the litany of cases
decided by the Supreme Court, Stevens found the employer's bur-
den "weighty"; when the burden shifted to the employer, it was
originally designed to be a burden of persuasion, rather than just
production. 6 ° In Griggs, the Court stated that the "touchstone"
of the disparate impact was "business necessity. ' 26 ' There was no
directive from Griggs which required it to be "essential. 262
Regardless of whether the business necessity was essential, Stevens
reasoned that the Court's prior interpretation of Title VII was that
the statute eliminated discrimination in employment - not just
discrimination in a business practice which is vital to operation. 63
Justice Stevens also expressed his dissatisfaction with the
majority's redefinition of the employee's burden of proof in the
disparate impact case. Stevens declared that the identification of
statistical disparity in specific employment practices was unwar-
ranted .2  Although a substantial causal link between the disparity
255. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 525 (1975)).
256. Id. at 660-61.
257. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 663. Such disregard compelled Justice Stevens to review eighteen years of
Supreme Court precedent of Title VII jurisprudence: "the majority's facile treatment of
settled law necessitates such a primer." Id. at 664.
259. Id. at 664-65. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
260. Id. at 671.
261. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
262. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Consolidated City of Jacksonville,
Duval County, Fla. v. Nash, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989), vacating mem. 837 F.2d 1534, 1537 (11th
Cir. 1988), a further discussion of which follows in note 281 infra.
263. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 U.S. 642, 671-72 (1989). Justice
Stevens stated, "I have always believed that the Griggs opinion correctly reflected the
intent of the Congress that enacted Title VII." Id. at 672.
264. Id. "It is elementary that a plaintiff cannot recover upon proof of injury alone;
1991]
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and the practice is required, such an act need not be the sole or
primary cause of the harm.265 Further, Justice Stevens noted that
proof of numerous questionable employment practices should sup-
port an employee's claim that the practices caused racial dispari-
ties.266 Title VII actions should be treated like "any lawsuit. 2 67
The changes made by the majority, in Stevens' view, created an
anomaly in the evidentiary standards of the civil lawsuit and
"tip[ped] the scales in favor of employers .... "268
Stevens stated that the majority, although correct in not
entering a final judgment and in remanding the case to the district
court, had not given the workers' evidence the credit it
deserved. 26 9 The Hazelwood School District v. United States2 7 °
decision, in Stevens' view, left open the definition of the proper
qualified population and the relevant labor market.2  Previous
Supreme Court decisions declared that numerical exactitude need
not be obtained at the expense of the needs of the particular
case. 2 72 However, Justice Stevens believed that the specific identi-
rather, the plaintiff must connect the injury to an act of the defendant in order to establish
prima facie that the defendant is liable." Id.
265. Id. at 672-73 (citing as cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). The
Wards Cove Court held that once an employee is in a "mixed motive" Title VII case, where
the challenged employment decision was the result of both legitimate and illegitimate
factors, proves that the prohibited factor played a motivating part in the employment
decision, the employer may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
prohibitive factor into account. See 49 Lab. Rel. Rep (BNA) 9 (May 1, 1989) (Extra Edition).
266. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 673. Justice Stevens observed that:
Evidence that virtually all the employees in the major categories of at-issue
jobs were white, whereas about two-thirds of the cannery workers were
nonwhite, may not by itself suffice to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. But such evidence of racial stratification puts the specific
employment practices challenged by respondents into perspective. Petitioners
recruit employees for at-issue jobs from outside the work force rather than from
lower-paying, overwhelmingly nonwhite, cannery worker positions.
Id. at 677 (footnotes omitted) (citing 34 EPD 1 34,437, pp. 33,828-29).
267. Id. at 673.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
271. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 674. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States 433 U.S.
299, 308 (1977) (statistical evidence of discrimination should compare the racial
composition of employees in disputed jobs to that "of the qualified ... population in the
relevant labor market").
272. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 674 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-86 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-
30 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); and Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971)). Justice Stevens believed that the findings of the
district court in this regard were ambiguous. 490 U.S. at 674-75. Justice Stevens wrote, "At
one point the District Court specifies 'Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, and California' as 'the
geographical region from which [petitioners] draw their employees,' but its next finding
refers to 'this relevant geographical area for cannery worker, laborer, and other nonskilled
jobs.'" Id. at 675 (citing 34 EPD 34,437, p. 33,828). Further, Stevens stated that this
deficiency respecting a crucial job qualification diminished the value of the cannery
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fication of those individuals qualified and willing to work in the
remote areas of Alaska, as the applicable pool, was more probative
than the "untailored general population statistics" on which the
cannery employers focused.Y
Thus, Justice Stevens stated that the segregation in living and
dining arrangements, along with nepotism and other subjective
criteria, constituted "obvious barriers to employment opportuni-
ties for nonwhites. '27 4 Notwithstanding the issue of business justi-
fication, Justice Stevens found it to be erroneous to hold that such
practices have no discriminatory consequence. The effect of the
decision by the majority sustained the practices of the canneries in
Alaska - which closely resemble a "plantation economy. "275
Justice Blackmun, like Stevens, found no logic in the major-
ity's upheaval of the settled law of Griggs and its progeny. 6
Rather, Blackmun believed that "a bare majority of the Court
takes three major strides backwards in the battle against race dis-
crimination. '27 7 In so doing, the majority reached and made Wat-
son the law, thus immunizing the cannery company's employment
practices from attack under a Title VII disparate impact analy-
S1S. 2 7i Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that "[o]ne wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination - or,
more accurately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a
problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was."'27 9
VIII. AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS
Determining the validity and propriety of Watson and Wards
Cove is like rationalizing the actions of a police officer who watches
someone lock their keys in their car, then arrests them when their
parking meter expires. °80 Watson presented the Court with an
company's statistical evidence. Id. at 676. Yet, Stevens noted that the workers' evidence,
which compared racial composition within the work force, identified a pool of workers
willing to work during the three-month salmon industry and familiar with the salmon
cannery operation and industry. Id.
273. Id. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing as cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n. 13 (1977), and International Bhd. Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 339-40, n.20 (1977)).
274. Id. at 677-78.
275. Id. at 664 n.4 (citation omitted).
276. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 661.
278. Id.
279. ld. at 662 (citing as cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510
(1989)).
280. Indeed, one author has stated: "The Supreme Court's three major, 5-4
discrimination rulings this month seem to reflect an unarticulated notion that the most
serious problems of civil-rights law facing America today are the legal harassment of
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exemplary opportunity to add another firm leg on which the Civil
Rights Act and Title VII could stand - to permit the examination
of subjective criteria in a statistical disparity to prove a prima facie
case of disparate impact. Instead, the Court pulled the chair out
from under the plaintiffs by altering the burden placed on the
employer in rebutting the claimant's prima facie evidence.281 The
Court allowed a wider avenue for Title VII plaintiffs to bring suit,
but restricted that ruling's effect by insisting on a coupling of any
statistical imbalance to a specific practice of the employer - a
wider avenue, but a slower and less effective vehicle.282
employers and the oppression of white males." Taylor, Now the Court Has Gone Too Far,
Legal Times, June 19, 1989 at 19.
281. See, e.g., Consolidated Jacksonville, Duval County, Fla. v. Nash, 490 U.S. 1103
(1989), vacating mem. 837 F.2d 1534 (l1th Cir. 1988). In Nash, the Court held that the
employer in a disparate impact case brought under Title VII must do more than merely
articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, and bears the burden of
proving or persuading that the examination at issue was a "business necessity." Id. at 1537.
Accordingly, Nash held that, contrary to the district court ruling, the employee is not
required to produce evidence that the test was job related; nor may the city meet its
burden of showing job relatedness by merely presenting evidence of how the test was
prepared. Id. Nash noted that the city failed to meet its burden, and the employee
established a prima facie case, and thus on remand, the district court must enter judgment
for the employee and grant him promotion. Id.
282. Sweeping legislation has attempted to supersede many of the Court's recent
rulings (Martin v. Wilks, 110 S.Ct. 11 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Watson; and Wards
Cove), restoring the burden of proof to employers in discrimination class actions;
disallowing intervention in court-approved affirmative-action consent decrees; providing
guidelines for states and cities with minority set-aside plans; and amending § 1981 to make
it apply to harassment and other claims the Court said it does not cover under its current
interpretation. Kornhauser, Civil-Rights Push for Legislative Relief, Legal Times, June 19,
1989, at 8.
Although originally designed to overturn as many as five recent Supreme Court cases,
the proposed bill, S. 2104/H.R. 4000, the Civil Rights Act of 1990, would overrule only
three cases: Patterson, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); and Wards Cove,
490 U.S. 642 (1989). S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 1018 (1990). At the
center of the debate was the disposition of the evidentiary standards in Wards Cove.
Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 21, 1990, at 7A, col. 2; The Washington Post, May 19, 1990,
at A6, col. 1.
To satisfy opponents of the bill, who claim employers would implement quotas to
insulate themselves from litigation, Sen. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and other sponsors changed the
bill's definition of business necessity from Wards Cove. Saint Paul Pioneer Press, July 11,
1990, at 2A, col. 5. The revised version stated that a" 'business necessity" is one that "bears
a substantial and demonstrable relationship'" to effective job performance," rather than an
"essential" relationship. Id.
President Bush in early 1990 threatened to veto a civil rights bill which would overturn
the five Supreme Court cases, supporting instead a form of the legislation that would only
reverse two of the cases - neither being the Wards Cove decision. The Washington Post,
April 5, 1990, at A25, col. 1.
On October 22, 1990, President Bush made good on his threat, vetoing the Civil Rights
Act of 1990, declaring that "he was taking a stand against efforts to 'introduce the
destructive force of quotas into our national employment system."' The Washington Post,
December 9, 1990, at K1, col. 3. See 136 Cong. Rec. E3706-02 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990)
(statement of Rep. Stokes).
At this writing, civil rights activists are vowing to nullify Wards Cove. In contrast, the
Bush administration hopes to retain at least a portion of that ruling, purporting that any less
restrictive language would cause employers to adopt quotas to insulate themselves from
litigation. The Washington Post, February 6, 1991, at A4, col. 6. Further, administration
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Griggs reinforced the worthy proposition of Title VII: to com-
bat all types of discrimination. Watson served that end by provid-
ing that a plaintiff may use subjective criteria as a means of
proving illegal discrimination. 283  This expansion of the analysis,
recognizing the use of subjective criteria, flows as a natural evolu-
tion of the model. Conversely, Wards Cove is inconsistent with
that evolution and erroneous, under stare decisis. Since Title VII's
enactment, the numerous discrimination cases heard by the
Supreme Court have provided no directive in the statute (prior to
Watson) that made the remedy applicable only if the plaintiff
showed a precise relationship between his statistical proof and one
or more of the employer's hiring or promotion practices.
Under the Griggs holding, a prima facie case of discrimination
is shown if a disproportionate number of those within a Title VII
protected class have been excluded from hiring or promotion.284
Watson declared that the proof must be "of a kind and a degree
sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected group .... ,,28 Granted, there is no
requirement of matching the statistics with particular employ-
ment practices, even under this standard. Rather, Watson stated
that a "rigid mathematical formula" was not required to establish a
prima facie case with statistical evidence under the disparate
impact model. 86  Even so, under the Wards Cove interpretation
officials claim to be more at ease with their position on the legislation because the polls
exhibited little change in the President's standing among minorities after he vetoed the
civil rights bill last year. Id.
Hence, as the emotional battle over this legislation continues, Yale law professor Drew
Days, a former assistant attorney general, concluded, "when this bill comes up again, it will
be back to the level of a swearing contest unless President Bush is willing to stand up, say
the bill has problems and that he is going to work them out. It is up to him." The
Washington Post, December 9, 1990, at K4, col. 3.
283. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
284. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See Disparate Impact and
Subjective, supra note 9, at 968 ("There is no suggestion either in the 1972 legislative
history or in the decisions ratified by the 1972 amendments that the rule in Griggs should
be applied only to employment practices which happen, like those challenged in Griggs, to
be objective."). See also Schulte, Title VII Employment Discrimination and the Small
Employer After Watson, The Hennepin Lawyer, May-June 1989, at 4.
285. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,331 (1977). "The plaintiffs in a case such as this are not required to
exhaust every possible source of evidence, if the evidence actually presented on its face
conspicuously demonstrates a job requirement's grossly discriminatory impact." (emphasis
added). Id.
286. Watson, 487 U.S. at 995. See supra note 206. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Chicago, 700
F. Supp. 921, 928 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (city failed to show that the limitation of eligibility for
taking writing examination for battalion chief in fire department to those promoted to
captain was justified by business necessity). Wynn v. Columbus Mun. Separate School Dist.,
692 F. Supp. 672, 684 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (although plaintiff prevailed on a discriminatory
treatment theory, she failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by not
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of the Watson holding, if a plaintiff employee fails to show a strict
correlation in his statistical disparity and a specific employment
practice, the employer may continue to use that practice -
regardless of the magnitude of its impact." 7
Accordingly, Watson and Wards Cove show that the Supreme
Court now expects a plaintiff to show impact from specific employ-
ment practices. Arguably, this demonstration of impact is the
same as proving intent: the plaintiff's disparate impact prima
facie case will now be based exclusively on his proof of discrimina-
tion derived from a specific practice, which has its genesis in the
employer's intent. Anything less than proof of discriminatory
intent would amount to coincidence. The employer must imple-
ment an employment practice for a reason. The Supreme Court
now requires a Title VII plaintiff to, in simple terms, prove that
the employer "meant to do it" - that it possessed the intent to
fashion an illegal employment practice, and had as its purpose dis-
crimination against a protected class. 8  If the plaintiff fails to
show the disparate impact of a specific practice, he or she can only
show a disparate impact throughout the company's practices, or
only a correlation, less than is now required under Watson - it
will be as though the discrimination simply does not exist. More
precisely and more realistically, such existing discrimination under
Wards Cove is something with which the employee will now have
to live.
If the connection of the specific employment practice, with
intent from Watson and Wards Cove, merges the disparate impact
test into the discriminatory treatment test, the Court, in effect,
will force the plaintiff to bring such definite evidence of discrimi-
nation that he may well have been equally as successful under the
discriminatory treatment theory.- 9 Indeed, plaintiffs may con-
showing causal connection between requiring the job requirements and any actual effect of
excluding disproportionate number of a protected class from employment opportunities);
Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1279-1307 (E.D. N.C. 1987) (subjective criteria failed to
establish disparate impact case; while "[p]laintiff has identified specific components of the
process she deems to be at fault, but there is not the slightest showing of disparate impact
on blacks and, a fortiori, a causal connection between the identified procedures and any
impact").
287. Rigler, supra note 9, at 31.
288. Id. at 32 (citing Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) ("proof of
each claim will involve a showing of disparity between the minority and majority groups in
an employer's workforce.").
289. Justice Powell, in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), stated that this interpretation of the statute blurs the distinction between
proving discrimination by showing disparate impact instead of proving it by showing
disparate treatment and "results in a holding inconsistent with the very nature of disparate-
impact claims." Id.
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sider the treatment theory as the preferred, or at least the less
treacherous, route by which to find redress from employment
discrimination.290
The outlook appears bleak for subjective criteria in the dispa-
rate impact analysis for employment discrimination claimants. 9 '
The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Wards Cove, which made
binding law out of the plurality decision in Watson, creates little
hope for those plaintiffs applying the disparate impact analysis.292
To require a strict correlation, as the Wards Cove Court mandates,
imposes an impossible burden on the employee plaintiff who has
only subjective criteria on which to measure his statistics.2 93 Sub-
jective criteria are slippery and almost intangible in nature; they
are the "judgment calls" and "gut feelings" of an employer that
make him choose one individual over another. However, the
nature of the subjective criteria should not prohibit its use in the
disparate impact analysis.294 Subjective criteria can be used by an
employer to discriminate against employees. Thus, those discrimi-
nated against must be allowed an avenue by which they can seek
remedy for such discrimination.
In addition to this strict correlation, the plaintiff's case is fur-
ther complicated by the employer's lessened burden of production
(rather than persuasion). The Wards Cove majority opinion for this
proposition was the Watson plurality, which cites no authority. 29
290. Consolidated Jacksonville, Duval County, Fla. v. Nash, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989),
vacating mem. 837 F.2d 1534, 1537 (11th Cir. 1988).
291. See supra text accompanying note 287.
292. But see Pelham, Civil-Rights Plaintiffs Are Used to Setbacks, Legal Times, June
19, 1989, at 8 ("[Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.] Atonio may have little practical effect on
challenges to the area's biggest employer: Such suits against the federal government had
already all but disappeared from the landscape, because almost no one could afford to take
them.").
293. See Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988). Justice Blackmnun stated in
Watson:
[Tihe requirement that a plaintiff in a disparate-impact case specify the
employment practice responsible for the statistical disparity [cannot] be turned
around to shield from liability an employer whose selection process is so poorly
defined that no specific criterion can be identified with any certainty, let alone
be connected to the disparate effect.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1010 n.10 (1988) (citations omitted).
294. Justice Blackmun, in Watson, stated:
While subjective criteria, like objective criteria, will sometimes pose difficult
problems for courts charged with assessing job-relatedness, requiring the
development of a great factual record and, perhaps, the exercise a greater
degree of judgment, that does not dictate that subjective-selection processes
generally are to be accepted at face value.
Id. at 1010 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
295. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, Inc., 490 U.S. 642, 671 n.18 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). As "Justice Blackmun explained in Watson (concurring in part and concurring
in judgment), and as I have shown here, the assertion profoundly misapprehends the
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In emphasizing the Griggs standard of business necessity, Stevens
stated that past Supreme Court opinions "always have emphasized
that in a disparate-impact case the employer's burden is
weighty."' 2 6 The Wards Cove majority's basis now requires only a
"reasoned review" of the business justification.297 The argument
against application of the disparate impact theory is that subjective
employment practices are difficult to validate; conversely, proof of
adverse impact would, as a practical matter, establish a Title VII
violation. This would force employers to abandon subjective
employment practices or to establish preferences. 298 Notwith-
standing, the argument in favor of the application is equally per-
suasive: "Subjective employment practices are likely to hide
discrimination that can be eliminated by requiring proof of busi-
ness necessity or job relationship. 299
Beyond the now near-impossible requirement of statistical
correlation, the Supreme Court also requires that a plaintiff rebut
the employer's showing of business necessity by proving that the
employer could have implemented a less discriminatory alterna-
tive;300 thus, a rigorous task. Therefore, even if the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case with the added restrictions on his
statistical evidence of disparity, he or she now has the additional
burden of proving a second case.30 ' To be successful, the plaintiff,
under Wards Cove, must discover and bring additional evidence of
such an alternative.
Indeed, even if the "revolutionized" prima facie case can
somehow be reconciled, or even justified under Griggs, it is
unimaginable that the Court could interpret or disregard its pre-
cedent to impose this additional hurdle for the Title VII plaintiff
who has already been put through an evidentiary steeplechase.
This legal contest is out of the employee's league, given the sub-
stantial amount of evidence and proof required. Practically speak-
ing, the entire plaintiff's case can only be satisfied by those
plaintiffs with the resources to hire experts to fight those of the
employer.
difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims." Id. (citations
omitted).
296. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
297. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
298. Van v. Plant & Field Serv. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (C.D. Ca. 1987). The
district court stated: "[rielying on word-of-mouth or walk in applicants when the only
applicants likely to walk [in] are members of the majority group amounts to unlawful
discrimination." Id. at 1317.
299. Id. at 1314.
300. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658.
301. Coyle, supra note 184, at 46, col. 4.
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In the future, tests administered to job applicants will not
require any strict sort of validation, as was the case prior to Watson
and Wards Cove. Regardless of the position the plaintiff is apply-
ing for - whether he or she is seeking a bank teller or manage-
ment position, or a job in a cannery factory, or any position in
between with regard to skill - the burden upon the employer in
defending a disparate impact challenge to an employment prac-
tice will be light."0 2
At this point in history, and in light of these recent decisions of
the Court, it would be unavailing to discuss what type of validation
means should be required in the disparate impact case. It is futile
to predict which of the three means of validation3 0 3 will be most
successful under the new standards because, in all likelihood, all
will be accepted by the courts. Further, almost any variation in
the means of validation will also be permitted, as the Supreme
Court has given the plaintiff little to argue regarding less discrimi-
natory alternatives. In most cases in the future, the employee will
not be able to find a less discriminatory practice instead of the
challenged practice, because the employer will have sufficiently
validated all of his practices to the extent that any alternative
would be uneconomical or otherwise burdensome.
Notwithstanding, content validation is the most reconcilable
means of validating a test, whether it be subjective or objective
criteria to the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII and the
Griggs disparate impact model.3 0 ' The employer who validates
his test with this means is testing the applicant by examining his or
her actual skills and knowledge which will be required for success-
ful job performance - not by looking at the applicant "in the
302. Police Officers for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393, 412 (S.D.
Ohio 1985) ("Job relatedness, as that term is used in Title VII litigation, simply means that a
selection procedure or requirement is a reliable predictor of job performance") (emphasis
added).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39 for a discussion of validation methods.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38 (discussion of content validation). See
generally Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis
Apply?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 63 (1988) (discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Watson decision); Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (Oct. 1987) (discussion of the foundations, burdens,
and applications of disparate impact analysis); Note, Whether to Overrule Statutory Based
Civil Rights Precedent: Whose Needs Should Prevail, 41 FLA. L. REV. 369 (Spring 1989)
(examination of civil rights statutes and stare decisis in light of Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union); Comment, Application of The Adverse Impact Analysis to Subjective Criteria in
Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1986) (discussion of
the differences between discriminatory treatment and disparate impact models, and a
suggestion that disparate impact analysis should be applied in cases where the employer
uses subjective criteria in hiring practices).
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abstract," as prohibited by Griggs.3 °5 This validation is most useful
for a court hearing a disparate impact claim of the kind set out by
the Burger majority in Griggs. Certainly courts will not require
anything more. Anything less will facilitate the evaporization of
the disparate impact test - the apparent thrust of the Rehnquist
Court in Watson and Wards Cove.
Instead of eliminating subjective criteria from the disparate
impact analysis, and subsequently the analysis itself in the Wards
Cove majority, the Supreme Court should eliminate a holding that
takes one-half of the Title VII remedy off the books. The Court
should again establish the deference it once gave the EEOC guide-
lines in subsequent cases dealing with disparate impact. Griggs is
the seminal decision in this area. The Court should return to its
reasoning and analysis in fashioning the definitive standard of dis-
parate impact analysis. Thus, if there is no indication of Congres-
sional intent to limit or eliminate subjective criteria from the
disparate impact analysis, there can be no basis for the Watson and
Wards Cove decisions. Plaintiffs in employment discrimination lit-
igation need a shot in the arm - not a shot in the foot or, even
worse yet, one in the dark.
CONCLUSION
This research traces the evolution of the Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as it has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court. Prior to Watson and Wards Cove, the Supreme Court uni-
formly interpreted Title VII as possessing two separate and dis-
tinct analyses. 3°" The discriminatory treatment analysis was
designed to remedy employees who could show specific instances
of discriminatory intent by their employers.30 7 The disparate
impact analysis was said to be contained within the statute to give
redress to those plaintiffs who could not establish discriminatory
intent - those discriminated against but lacking tangible evidence
under the discriminatory treatment analysis.30 8 In Griggs, the
Supreme Court recognized the disparate impact analysis for the
first time to eradicate all barriers to employment opportunities.30 9
305. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
306. The effect of Watson and Wards Cove has led Professor Charles B. Craver of
George Washington University to state, "If I were a plaintiff's civil rights lawyer, I would be
thinking of a new line of work. That's how significant I think these rulings are. I don't
know if this court realizes how badly it has set back civil rights." Coyle, supra note 184 at
46, col. 1.
307. See supra notes 13-35 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 36-149 and accompanying text.
309. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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The majority of the Court in Wards Cove declared that the Griggs
Court was mistaken. Title VII was not enacted by Congress to rid
all illegal employment discrimination - only that discrimination
in which the employer's intent and practice is proven to create a
disparate impact - discrimination for which the employer is
caught red-handed.

